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THE ACTION OF DEBT -AT
COMMON LAW,
UNDER MODERN CODES, PRACTICE ACTS
AND RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE*
PART II
ALISON REPPY

IV.

FORMS OF ORIGINAL WRIT AND DECLARATIONS
ORIGINAL WRIT IN DEBT

GEORGE THE THIRD, by the grace of God, of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith
To the Sheriff of .......... County.
GREETING:

COMMAND C. D., late of ........ , that justly and without delay
he render to A. B. the sum of E.... of good and lawful money of

Great Britain, which he owes to, and unjustly detains from him, as it
is said: and unless he shall so do, and if the said A. B. shall make you
secure of prosecuting his claim, then summon by good summoners,
the said C. D. that he be before us, on .......... wheresoever we
shall be in England, (or, in C. P. before our justices at Wesminster,
on .......... ,) to shew wherefore he hath not done it, and have
there the names of the summoners, and this writ.
Witness ourself, &c.
L. S.
TmD's Appendix, 20 (8th ed. London 1819).
DECLARATION IN DEBT ON SIMPLE CONTRACT
IN THE KING'S BENCH.............Term, in the ........ Year

of the reign of King George the Fourth.
...... , to wit, C. D. was summoned to answer A. B. of a plea
that he render to the said A. B. the sum of .......... pounds, of
good and lawful money of Great Britain, which he owes to and unjustly detains from him. And thereupon the said A. B., by ......... I
his attorney, complains: For that whereas the said C. D. heretofore,
to wit, on the ......... day of ......... , in the year of our Lord
.......... at .......... , in the county of .......... was indebted
to the said A. B. in the sum of ........
pounds, of lawful money of
Great Britain, for divers goods, wares, and merchandise by the said
A. B. before that time sold and delivered to the said C. D., at his special instance and request, to be paid by the said C. D. to the said
A. B. when he, the said C. D. should be thereto afterwards requested;
whereby, and by reason of the said last-mentioned sum of money being
and remaining wholly unpaid, an action hath accrued to the said A. B.
ALISON REPPY is Dean and Professor of Law at New York Law School.
* This is a continuation from page 45 of an article begun in the January issue
of the Naw YORx LAW FoRum.
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to demand and have of and from the said C. D. the said sum of
........ pounds above demanded. Yet the said C. D. (although often
requested) hath not as yet paid the said sum of .......... pounds
above demanded, or any part thereof, to the said A.B., but so to do
hath hitherto wholly refused, and still refuses, to the damages of the
said A. B. of .......... pounds; and therefore he brings his suit, &c.
STEPHEN, A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading in Civil
Actions, C.I, 68 (3d Am. ed., Washington, D. C. 1895).
DECLARATION IN DEBT ON A SPECIALTY' 0 2-ON A COMMON
MONEY BOND
IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH (or Common Pleas)
ON the .......... day of .......... , A.D ......... (Venue)
to wit. A. D. by E. F. his attorney (or in his own proper person)
complains of C. D. who has been summoned to answer the said A. B.
(or plaintiff) in an action on debt on a common money bond. For
that whereas the defendant, on the .......... day of ...........
A.D ........... by his certain writing obligatory sealed with his seal,
and now shown to the said Court here, acknowledged himself to be
held and firmly bound to the plaintiff in the sum of £E.... above demanded, to be paid to the plaintiff, yet the defendant (although often
requested so to do) hath not as yet paid the said sum of £.... above
demanded, or any part thereof, to the plaintiff; to the damages of the
plaintiff of £.... ; and therefore he brings his suit, &c.
1 CHITTY, Precedents in Pleading, 421 (1st Am. ed., Springfield 1839).
163
DECLARATION IN DEBT ON A STATUTE
IN THE KING'S BENCH (or Common Pleas). ......... Term,
in the .......... Year of the reign of King ..........
FOR that whereas the defendant before and at the time of the
giving the notice to quit hereinafter mentioned, and from thence until
a certain day, to wit, the .......... Day of .......... A.D .......
held and enjoyed a certain messuage and premises, with the appurtenances, as tenant thereof to the plaintiff, to wit, from year to
year, for so long a time as the plaintiff and defendant should respectively please (or "for a certain term of years ending on the last-mentioned day,") the reversion of the said premises, with the appurte162 Debt on a Specialty and Covenant are concurrent remedies where the amount
due upon the breach of a sealed instrument is a sum certain or a liquidated amount.
Anonymous, 3 Leo. 119, 74 Eng. Rep. 579 (158S).
Wager of Law had no application in Debt on a Specialty. MORGaN, THE STuoY OF
LAW, c. VI, Debt, 92 (2d ed. Chicago 1948).
163 This specific form was used by a landlord who sought to recover Debt on the
Statute of 2 Geo. II, c. 28, § 1 (1728) for double value for holding over after notice to
quit, and was taken in substance from the form used in Wilkinson v. Hall, 3 Bing. N. C.

508, 132 Eng. Rep. 506 (1837).

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

rvoL. 4

nances, during all that time belonging to the plaintiff; and thereupon,
whilst the defendant so held and enjoyed the said tenements, with the
appurtenances, as tenant thereof to the plaintiff as aforesaid, and
whilst the said reversion thereof belonged to the plaintiff as aforesaid,
to wit, on ('c.) the plaintiff gave notice in writing to the defendant,
and thereby then demanded of and required the defendant to quit
and deliver up the possession of the said tenements, with the appurtenances, of the plaintiff, on the said ..........
day of ..........
A.D. .......... ; and the plaintiff avers that the tenancy aforesaid
ended and was duly determined on the last-mentioned day by the said
notice, and that after (or "upon" as the case may be,) the determination of the said tenancy as aforesaid, and whilst the defendant continued in possession of the said tenements, with the appurtenances,
and the said plaintiff was so entitled to the possession thereof, to wit,
on (&c.) the plaintiff, by a certain notice in writing, then made and
signed by him, and delivered to the defendant, of the said tenements,
with the appurtenances, to the plaintiff, nevertheless the defendant,
not regarding the statute in such case made and provided, did not nor
would, at the determination of the said term and tenancy as aforesaid, deliver the possession of the said tenements, with the appurtenances, or any part thereof, to the plaintiff, according to the said
notice so given and the demand so made as aforesaid, but wholly
neglected and refused so to do, and on the contrary thereof wilfully
held over the said tenements, with the appurtenances, after the determination of the said term and tenancy, and after the said notice
had expired, and after the said demand so made as aforesaid, for a
long space of time, to wit, from thence hitherto, during all which
time the defendant did keep the plaintiff out of the possession of the
said tenements, with the appurtenances, and every part thereof, he
the plaintiff during all that time being entitled to the possession thereof, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided;
and the plaintiff avers, that the said tenements, with the appurtenances,
during the said time of holding over the same and keeping the plaintiff out of the possession thereof as aforesaid, were of great value, to
wit, the yearly value of £ .... , and by reason of the premises and by
force of the statute in such case made and provided, the defendant became liable to pay the plaintiff a large sum of money, to wit, the sum
of I....,
being at the rate of double the yearly value of the said
tenements, with the appurtenances, for so long as the same were so
detained as aforesaid; and thereby and by force of the said statute,
an action hath accrued to the plaintiff to demand and have of and
from the defendant the aid sum of E.... , being the sum above demanded, yet the defendant hath not paid the sum or any part thereof;
to the damage of the plaintiff of I.... ; and therefore he brings his
suit, &c.

1

CHITTY,

field, 1839).

Precedents in Pleading, 432 (1st Am. ed. Spring-
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164
DECLARATION IN DEBT ON A JUDGMENT

Term, in
IN THE KING'S BENCH or Common Pleas, ..........
year of the reign of King ..........
the ..........
FOR that whereas the plaintiff heretofore, to wit, in ...........
Day
or "on the ..........
term, in the year of our Lord ..........
," in the Court of our Lord the King
, A.D ...........
of ..........
of the Bench, here, to wit, at Westminster, in the county of Middlesex;" or if in the Exchequer, state "in the Court of our Lord the King
of his Exchequer of Pleas at Westminster in the county of Middlesex",
by the consideration and judgment of the said Court recovered against
the defendant in the sum of £.... above demanded, which in and by
the said Court was then and there adjudged to the plaintiff for his
damages, which he had sustained as well by reason of the non-performance by the defendant of certain promises "or a certain promise,"
if there were only one count in the original declaration and judgment,
then lately made by the defendant to the plaintiff, as for his costs and
charges by him about his suit in that behalf expended or if the judgment be in debt, &c. describe it accordingly; in debt the form if "a
certain debt of E...., as also £E.... for his damages which he had
sustained as well by reason of the detention of the said debt as for his
costs and charges by him about his suit in that behalf expended",
whereof the defendant was convicted, as by the record and proceedings
thereof remaining in the said Court fully appears; which said Judgment still remains in full force, unreversed, and unsatisfied; and the
plaintiff hath not obtained any execution or satisfaction of or upon
the said judgment; whereby an action hath accrued to the plaintiff to
demand and have of and from the defendant the said sum of £E....
above demanded, yet the defendant hath not paid the same or any
part thereof; to the plaintiff's damage of £ .... ; and thereupon he
brings his suit, &c.
1 CHITTY Precedents in Pleading, 430 (1st Am. ed. Springfield 1839).
DECLARATION IN DEBT-ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS:
(1) IN GENERAL
Prima Facie Case in Contract Actions
IN Contract Actions the plaintiff's prima facie case consists in
showing the normal affirmative elements of a valid contract and the
V.

264 The judgment in Debt on a Record provides that the plaintiff "do have and
recover of the defendant" a given sum of money or a specific article. This language
implies that the plaintiff is entitled not to something new, but to regain property which
belongs to him although unlawfully possessed by the defendant. Likewise with a Recognizance entered upon the Records of a Court declaring one person indebted to another.
In both cases the judgment establishes the plaintiff's right to the money or the chattel
and at the same time imposes upon the defendant a duty to pay the money declared due
or to deliver the specific chattel to the complainant. Once the indebtedness is established
by a Record, Debt, by reason of its proprietary nature, becomes an effective remedy.
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coming into operation of an affirmative contractual duty; on the other
hand, negative elements, such as fraud or illegality, which destroy the
validity of the contract, and Matters of Excuse and Discharge, as
impossibility, performance, or release, must come from the defendant,
to prevent plaintiff's recovery. Thus, where the plaintiff has proved
the existence of the debt sued on, the burden of proving payment is
on the defendant. The plaintiff must allege nonpayment of the money
demand to make the Declaration perfect on its face; but payment is
an Affirmative Defense, even in many jurisdictions where it may be
raised by the defendant under a Denial. Thus negative averments
may be necessary to the plaintiff's pleading, though they constitute
no part of his original substantive cause of action which he is called
upon to prove or establish.
In Actions upon Contracts for Damages, the plaintiff must assign
the breach by the defendant which is relied upon as ground for recovery, and allege the essential facts to apprise the defendant in what
particulars he has failed to perform. But when the plaintiff pleads or
proves the contract, and the fulfillment of conditions to create an
operative duty of performance by the defendant as by tender or performance on his own part, it is then incumbent upon the defendant to
prove performance, or sufficient excuse for nonperformance as an Affirmative Defense, without proof of breach on behalf of the plaintiff.
Even the burden of proving the General Allegation of Performance
by the plaintiff as a Condition Precedent is taken off the plaintiff in
Modern English Practice, unless the defendant Specially Pleads Nonperformance of some Condition.
For Sum Certain Only
THE Mode of Stating the Cause of Action in Debt varies according to the source or basis of the obligation, which, as we have seen,
may be either a Simple (Executed) Contract, a Specialty, a Statute
or a Judgment. However, before considering the Essential Allegations
applicable to each of the Four Varieties of Debt, it may be helpful to
discuss in more detail the requirement that the action must be for a
sum certain-a requirement which is common in each of the Four
Forms of Debt.
The Action of Debt lies only for a liquidated sum of money; that
is, a pecuniary demand where the amount due is fixed and specific or
where it can readily be reduced to certainty by a mathematical computation. Blackstone tells us that in an Action of Debt the plaintiff must
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prove the whole debt he claims, or recover nothing at all, for the debt
is only a single cause of action fixed and determined, and which, therefore, if the proof varies from the claim, cannot be looked upon as the
same contract whereof the performance is sued for. "If, therefore, I
bring an action for £30, I am not at liberty to prove a debt of £20 and
recover a Verdict thereon, any more than, if I bring an Action of
1 65
Detinue for a horse, I cannot thereby recover an ox." 1

In Rudder v. Price,'6 6 however, Lord Loughborough says, that
while the demand in an Action of Debt must have been for a sum certain in its nature, yet it was by no means so necessary that the amount
be set out precisely that less could not be recovered. 6 7 A promise to
pay so much as certain services or goods were worth would not formerly support a Count in Debt, as the price must be fixed. 6 S But at the
present day either Debt or Indebitatus Assumpsit will lie for the
reasonable value of services or goods, though not fixed by the parties.
If the claim is for the value of something given as contrasted with
unliquidated damages, that is sufficiently certain.
Debt will not lie, for instance, for a refusal to convey shares in
a building according to the terms of a contract under seal. The
remedy is by Action of Covenant. 69 Neither will Debt lie for breach
of a promise of indemnity against loss or damage by fire contained in
a fire insurance policy, although on principle this may well be questioned as the duty to pay is absolute. 7°
Debt will not lie on a guaranty contract, as on a promise to pay
the debt of another in consideration of forbearance, etc.,1 71 or in some
165 3 BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

ON THE LAWS

OF ENGLAND,

C. 9, 154 (7th

ed.

Oxford 1775). See, also, the following cases: Arkansas: Gregory v. Bewly, 5 Ark. 318
(1843); Illinois: Mix v. Nettleton, 29 I1. 245 (1862); Hoy v. Hoy, 44 Ill. 469 (1867);
Haynes v. Lucas, 50 Ill.
436 (1869); Massachusetts: Knowles v. Inhabitants of Eastham,
11 Cush. (Mass.) 429 (1853); Pennsylvania: Baum v. Tonkin, 110 Pa. 569, 1 AUt. 535(1885).
166 1 H. BI. 547, 126 Eng. Rep. 314 (1791).
167 Maine: Norris v. School Dist. No. 1 in Windsor, 12 Me. 293, 28 Am. Dec. 182
(1835); Tennessee: Thompson v. French, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 452 (1837); Federal: United
States v. Colt, Fed. Case. No. 14839 (Pet. C. C.) 145 (1818).
168 Young and Ashburnham's Case, 3 Leo. 116, 74 Eng. Rep. 606 (1578). Cf.
Norris v. School District No. 1 in Windsor, 12 Me. 293, 28 Am. Dec. 182 (1835);
Serreto v. Rockland, S. T. & 0. H. Ry., 101 Me. 140, 63 AUt. 651 (1906).
169 Fox River Mfg. Co. v. Reeves, 68 Ill.
403 (1873).
170 See Flanagan v..Camden Mut. Ins. Co., 25 N. J. L. 506 (1856). See, also,
Heffron v. Rochester Ins. Co., 220 I1. 514, 77 N. E. 262 (1906), in which it was held
there could be no recovery on a policy of fire insurance under the Common Counts. Cf.
People's Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 53 Pa. 353, 91 Am. Dec. 217 (1866).
171 1 CHITTY, TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES TO ACTION, WITH PRECEDENTS

AND FORMS, c. II, 127 (16th Am. ed. by Perkins, Springfield 1876); English: Bishop v.
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jurisdictions against the indorser of a bill or note, or by an indorsee
against the acceptor of a bill.1 2 But the Action of Debt has been

allowed more extensively in America as a remedy on Bills and Notes
than in England, even against parties secondarily liable. In general
Debt will lie wherever a duty is created to pay a sum certain. If, the
one primarily liable does not pay, the indorser or drawer comes under
173
a duty to pay the amount of the Note or Bill.

The action cannot generally be supported for one entire debt,

payable in installments, till all are due,'17 though for rent payable

quarterly, or otherwise, or for an annuity, or on a stipulation to pay a
certain sum on one day and a certain sum on another day, Debt lies on
each default.1 5 And even where one sum is payable by installments,

if the payment is secured by a penalty, Debt may be maintained for
76
the penalty.

Young, 2 Bos. & P. 83, 126 Eng. Rep. 1169 (1800); New Jersey: Gregory v. Thompson,
81 N. J. L. 166 (1865); Tennessee: Tappan v. Campbell, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 436 (1836).
But see, also, and compare: Illinois: Potter v. Groubeck, 174 Ill. 404, 7 N. E. 586 (1886) ;
Tennessee: Hall v. Rodgers, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 536 (1847); Brown v. Bussey, 7 Humph.
(Tenn.) 573 (1847); Federal: Cubbins v. Mississippi River Common, 241 U. S. 351, 36
S. Ct. 671, 6 L. Ed. 1041 (1915). See, also, Aims, LE TuRES ON LEGAL HIsToRY, LECTURE
VII, Debt 93 (Cambridge 1913); Ames, Parol ContractsPrior to Assumpsit, 8 HAuv. L.
REV. 252, 261 (1894).
172 English: Bishop v. Young, 2 Bros. & P. 78, 126 Eng. Rep. 1116 (1800); Cloves
v. Williams, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 868, 132 Eng. Rep. 645 (1837); Virginia: Smith v. Segar,
3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 394 (1809); Stovall's Ex'r v. Woodson, 2 Mumf. (Va.) 303 (1811);
Quare, Hilborn v. Artus, 3 Seam. (Ill.) 344 (1841); Contra: Tennessee: Planters' Bank
v. Galloway, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 342 (1850); Federal: Raborg v. Peyton, 15 U. S. 385,
4 L. Ed. 268 (1817); Home v. Semple, 3 McLean 150, Fed. Cas. No. 6, 658 (1843).
In Watkins v. Wake, 7 Mees. & W. 488, 151 Eng. Rep. 858 (1841), it was held
that the action would lie by the indorsee against his immediate indorser. See, also,
Stratton v. Hill, 3 Price 253, 146 Eng. Rep. 253 (1816).
And it has been held that Debt will lie by the indorsee of a bill or note against the
drawer or maker. New York: Willmarth v. Crawford, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 343 (1833);
Pennsylvania: Camp v. Bank of Oswego, 10 Watts (Pa.) 130 (1840).
And in Loose v. Loose, 36 Pa. 538 (1860), it was maintained by the indorsee against
a remote indorser. See, also, Onondaga County Bank v. Bates, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 93 (1842).
Cf. the following: Pennsylvania: Weiss v. Mauch Chunk Iron Co., 58 Pa. 295 (1868);
Federal: Raborg v. Peyton, 15 U. S. 385, 4 L. Ed. 268 (1817); 3 STREET, FOUNDATIONS
OF LEGAL Limrry, c. XI, Action of Debt, 139 (Northport 1906).
173 Raborg v. Peyton, 15 U. S., 385, 4 L. Ed. 268 (1817).
174 English: Hunt's Case, Owen 42, 74 Eng. Rep. 886 (1588); Rudder v. Price, 1
H. Bl. 547, 126 Eng. Rep. 314 (1791); Illinois: Hoy v. Hoy, 44 Ill. 469 (1867); Indiana:
Farnham v. Hay, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 167 (1833); Pennsylvania: Sparks v. Garrigues, 1
Bin. (Pa.) 162 (1806); Federal: Fontaine v. Aresta, 2 M'Lean 127, Fed. Cas. No.
4,905 (1840). See, also, West Virginia: Jameson v. Board of Education, 78 W. Va. 612,
8 S. E. 255, L. R. A. 1916F, 926 (1916).
175 English: Hunt's Case, Owen 42, 74 Eng. Rep. 886 (1588); Rudder v. Price, 1
H. BI. 547, 126 Eng. Rep. 314 (1791); Illinois: Hoy v. Hoy, 44 Ill. 469 (1867).
17 English: Coates v. Hewit, 1 Wils. (K. B.) 80, 95 Eng. Rep. 503 (1744); Illinois:
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Debt will not lie to recover on a promise to pay a debt out of
a particular fund, or in services, or in a particular kind of currency
not legal tender.17 7 It does not lie, for instance, on a note or writing
obligatory for the payment of a certain sum in "United States bank
notes, or its branches," or in notes of a particular bank,17 8 or in lumber,'1 79 or in county orders. 180 But it will lie for a debt payable in
money or goods at the option of either party, or to pay a definite sum
in goods.' 8 '
In the cases mentioned the only remedy is by Special Assumpsit
or Covenant to recover Damages for Breach of Promise as contrasted
with specific enforcement of the Duty to Pay a Sum Certain.
The Breach
As this Action is only sustainable for the recovery of a debt) the
Breach is necessarily confined to a Statement of the Nonpayment of
the Money previously alleged to be payable; and such Breach is nearly
Hoy v. Hoy, 44 Ill. 469 (1867); Federal: Fontaine v. Aresta 2 M'Lean 127, Fed. Cas.
No. 4,905 (1840).
'77 Alabama: Young v. Scott, 5 Ala. 475 (1843); Arkansas: Hudspeth v. Gray, 5
Ark. 157 (1842); Illinois: Illinois State Hospital for Insane v. Higgins, 15 Ill. 185 (1853);
Mix v. Nettleton, 29 nl. 245 (1862); Indiana: Wilson v. Hickson, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 230
(1822); Osborne v. Fulton, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 234 (1822); Kentucky: Sinclair v. Piercy,
5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 63 (1830); January v. Henry, 3 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 8 (1825);
Missouri: Snell v. Kirby, 3 Mo. 21, 22 Am. Dec. 456 (1831); New Jersey: Scott v.
Conover, 6 N. J. L. 222 (1822); Tennessee: Deberry v. Darnell, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 451
(1830); Virginia: Beirne v. Dunlap, 8 Leigh (Va.) 514 (1837). Cf. Gift v. Hall, 1
Humph. (Tenn.) 480 (1840).
Debt will lie on a contract to pay either in property "or" in money. Alabama:
Henry v. Gamble; Minor (Ala.) 15 (1820); Bradford v. Stewart, Minor (Ala.) 44
(1821); Kentucky: Dorsey v. Lawrence, Hardin (Ky.) 517 (1808); Tennessee: Crockett
v. Moore, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 145 (1855); Virginia: Minnick v. Williams, 77 Va. 758
(1883).
178 Wilson v. Hickson, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 230 (1822); Osborne v. Fulton, 1 Blackf.
(Ind.) 234 (1822); Cf. Belford v. Woodward, 158 Ill. 122, 41 N. E. 1097, 29 L. R. A.
593 (1895), involving gold coin.
179 Cassady v. Laughlin, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 134 (1832).
It seems, however, that Debt lies if the debtor merely had the option to pay in
goods, or do some other act, and has not done so. Illinois: Fox River Mfg. Co. v.
Reeves, 68 Ill. 403 (1873) ; Ohio: Nelson v. Ford, 5 Ohio 473 (1832) ; Tennessee: Bloomfield v. Hancock, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 101 (1826); Young v. Hawkins, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 171
(1833).
180 See Mix v. Nettleton, 29 Il. 245 (1862), in which it was held that Debt will
lie on a judgment payable in United States gold coin. Cf. Belford v. Woodward, 158
Il. 122, 41 N. E. 1097, 29 L. R. A. 593 (1895).
181 English: Emery v. Fell, 2 T. R. 28, 100 Eng. Rep. 16 (1787); Illinois: McKinnie
v. Lane, 230 Ill. 544, 82 N. E. 878, 120 Am. St. Rep. 338 (1907), involving Indebitatus
Assumpsit; 3 S rET, FOUNDATIONS Op LEGAL LIABInT, c. XVI, The Action of Indebitatus Assumpsit, 188 (Northport 1906); AmEs, LEcTuRS ON LEGAL HiSTORY, Lecture
XIV, Implied Assumpsit, 153 (Cambridge 1913).
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similar, whether the Action be on Simple Contract, Specialty, Record,
or Statute. 2 It is an Allegation that the defendant, though often
requested so to do, has not paid to the plaintiff the sum demanded,
but has wholly neglected and refused so to do.'8

3

If the Action be on

a Bond, whether a Common Money Bond or a Special Bond for the
8 4 the penalty
Performance of Covenants, within the Statute,"
is the
debt at law, and the Breach by Nonpayment should therefore be
alleged in the above form; but, if the Bond have a Condition within
the Statute, the Breaches of such Condition should be Assigned. 8 Real
Conditions Subsequent need not be Negatived in the Declaration.' 80
The Damages
By the term "Damages" is here meant a demand additional to and
independent of the sum or debt claimed, which, if for the detention
of the sum expressly agreed to be paid, as for interest, should be for
more than a nominal sum, and for sufficient to cover the amount of
the demand. 8 7 The Damages in this action are usually nominal only,
for a small sum. Though they are only an incident to the main object
of the suit, some Damage must always be alleged for the detention of
the debt.
In an Action on a Penal Bond, the Damages assessed for Breach
of Condition Subsequent are not included in the Judgment, and will be
greater than those laid for the detention of the debt. 188
182 Illinois: Rynders v. Coxie, 80 Ill. App. 629 (1898); New York: Gale v. O'Bryan,
12 Johns. (N. Y.) 216 (1815).
183 The Allegation of a Demand is necessary, though the omission is curcd by a
Verdict. Lusk v. Cassell, 25 Ill.
191 (1861).
184 The act referred to is the English Statute of 8 & 9 William III, c. 11 (1696),
which has been substantially adopted into the Common Law of this country. New
Jersey: Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Van Voorst, 20 N. J. L. 167 (1843); West
Virginia: Reynolds v. Hurst, 18 W. Va. 648 (1881).
185 Patrick v. Rucker, 19 Ill.
428 (1858).
The .burden of Assigning and Proving Breaches of the Conditions of a Penal Bond
is now thrown on the plaintiff. Barrett v. Douglas Park Bldg. Ass'n., 75 Ill. App. 98
(1897); Cf. Douglas & Hennessy, 15 R. I. 272, 3 AfU. 213, 7 Ad. 1 (1886). See, also,
2 W LiSTON, A TREATISE ON TaE LAW OF CONTRACTS, c. XXIV, § 667, 1287 (New York
1936-1945).
186 Lesker v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 239 Ill. 502, 88 N. E. 208
(1909); 2 WILISTOiN, A TREATISE Ow =E LAW or CONTRACTS, C. XXIV, § 667, 1287
(New York 1936-1945).
187 Illinois: Russell v. City of Chicago, 22 IIl. 283 (1859); Brown v. Smith, 24
Ill.
196 (1860); Lender v. Monroe's Ex'rs., 33 IlI. 388 (1864); McGuire v. Town of
Xenia, 54 fI1. 299 (1870); New Jersey: Allen v. Smith, 12 N. J. L. 159 (1831).
188 Allen v. Smith, 12 N. J. L. 159 (1831). Cf. Stephens v. Sweeney, 2 Gil. (111.)
375 (1845).
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VI.

DECLARATION IN DEBT-ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS:
(2) IN DEBT ON SIMPLE (EXECUTED) CONTRACT
BEFORE discussing the problem of stating a cause of action in
Debt as applied to Simple Contracts, it is essential to consider the distinction between what were called Executed Contracts at Common
Law and what are considered as Contracts Under Modern Law; also
the distinction between Executed and Executory contracts as they
originated at Common Law, together with some of the characteristics
and peculiarities of each. Thereafter, with an understanding of the
source or basis of the obligation sought to be enforced, we may intelligently consider the essential obligations necessary to state a good
cause of action in Debt.
Executed Contracts
BOTH an Executed and an Executory Contract, if broken, will
subject the parties who commit a breach, to liability, but upon wholly
different theories. Thus, if B agrees to buy certain goods from A, and
to pay for the same, if A delivers the goods, and B fails to pay for the
goods, B is clearly liable to A, as a matter of morality, but not because
of his promise. His obligation is entirely independent of the promise,
and would be equally binding if there were no promise. But if B
refused to accept the goods when delivered, A, the vendor might hold
B liable in damages for any loss sustained by reason of B breaking his
promise to accept and pay for the goods. The theory of liability in
this latter situation is that B has breached his contract, not that B
has received anything which entitled A to an equivalent amount. Such
Damages will usually be nominal, or at least bear little proportion to
the value of the goods which the vendor sold. In other words, as we
have seen, prior to the advent of Special Assumpsit A would have had
no remedy at all where B refused to receive the goods, as a parol
promise created no legal obligations, nor did it give the promisee a
right of action for its breach. But prior to Special Assumpsit, under
which the vendor could recover for his loss of a profit resulting from
B's breach, a purchaser could not take or receive another's property
without compensation therefor. Such acceptance of goods constituted a
causa debendi, upon which the Action of Debt might be sustained.
(I) Debt Not in General Available on a Broken Promise.-Debt,
then, was applied to such cases on a theory not generally understood
by the modern mind. To adapt the Ancient Real Action-the Writ of
Right-to the recovery of a loan, sale or other Executed Contract, it
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was essential to first, estimate the amount owed as a specific sum of

money, and second, to impute to the plaintiff a property in that pecuniary res, by treating the sum owed as a specific piece of property in
the hands of the debtor and which, by means of the force and effect
of the so-called Executed Contract, had been transmitted to the ownership of the creditor, becoming his, by operation of law, as the equivalent of the quid pro quo which the creditor had transferred to the
debtor. And under this theory the law sometimes recognized such

reciprocal transfer of title, even where there was no passing of a quid
pro quo, as in the case where B bargained to buy a horse from A, the
Court held that the property was in B, hence he was entitled to bring

Detinue, where A, the seller, was entitled to have a Writ of Debt for
the price." 9

In consequence of the foregoing, then, we may say that Debt lies
upon what we now refer to as Simple (Executed) Contracts, upon any
parol agreement which has been carried out by the plaintiff in such a

manner as to transfer a quid pro quo, goods, labor, or money, to the
defendant, so as to entitle the plaintiff to recover the corresponding
price which is still in the hands of the defendant debtor. Says Professor Keigwin: "The efficient fact is the meritorious performance on
the one side which-of itself and apart from the agreement-engenders

a duty to make recompense for the benefit thereby imparted to the
other side. The obligation enforced results from the facts accomplished
by the plaintiff, and is founded upon the emolument inuring to the defendant from the transaction."' 9 0
(II) Debt Lies on the Contract, Assumpsit on the Promise.What, then, was meant when it was said that Debt lies on the Contract, Assumpsit on the Promise?'
The distinction may be clearly
189 Y. B. 20 Henry VI (1442). See, also, a statement by Mr. Justice Holmes, in
1916, in the case of Portuguese-American Bank v. Welles, 242 U. S. 7, P. 11, 37 S. Ct.
3, 4, 61 L. Ed. 116, 118, in which he said: "When a man sells a horse, what he does
from the point of view of the law is to transfer a right: and a right, being regarded by
the law as a thing, even though a res incorporealis, it is not illogical to apply the same
rule to a debt that would be applied to a horse."
190 KEIGVn, CASES ON COmaSON LAW PLEADiNG, c. H, The Common Law Actions,
58 (2d ed., Rochester 1934).
191 "In Comyn's Digest, written about 1740 and published in 1762 after the author's
death, it is laid down that 'Debt lies upon every contract in deed or in law"; and the
instance given to illustrate the doctrine is a use of the action to recover a statutory
penalty, the unlawful act being the contract. So in 1677, in the Fourth Section of the
Statute of Frauds, provision is made concerning, not any contract for the sale of lands,
but any contract or sale of lands, apparently distinguishing 'between an Executed Transaction and an Executory Agreement." Keigwin, The Action of Debt, 11 GEo. L. J.
28, 37 (1923).
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perceived if we examine the case of Sands v. Trevelian,19 2 decided in
1630. In that case A requested B, an attorney at law, to defend his
friend C, who had been sued, and A undertook to pay for the service
rendered. B performed the service requested and B, having failed to
pay, C demanded payment by A, and upon his refusal, sued A in Debt
upon his undertaking. In the Court of Common Pleas it was held that
Debt by C against A would not lie, but that Special Assumpsit would
lie on A's promise to C to pay the debt of B, the court distinguishing
between a general retainer by A to perform services for C, coupled
with a promise to pay what C laid out or as much as he should expend
in favor of B, from a retainer of B by A and for C, coupled with a
bare promise to pay if B failed to do so. In the former case Debt will
lie by B against A, but not in the latter. In the latter case Special Assumpsit is the only remedy, the theory being that there was no quid
pro quo passing from B to A, and hence no debt.
From the result in the Sands case, two inferences may be drawn,
first, that in the legal mind of the late Sixteenth and early Seventeenth
Centuries, the word "contract" meant only a Simple (Executed) Contract, which covered factual situations, in which there had been an
engagement to swap something of material benefit, the effect of which
was an emolument moving from one party to the other, as in the
instant case, from the attorney B, to his client A; second, a debt could
not be created by a promise, where it was made to pay a debt chargeable to another other than the promisee. In the Sands case the only
debt was that created by B's performance of services to C, which performance, by operation of law, imposed a legal duty upon C to pay B,
which was remediable in Debt by B against C. No debt existed as
between B and A, as A had received no quid pro quo from B. As to A,
then, no causa debendi in Debt existed; there was, however, an undertaking which did not involve any benefit to A, the promisor, but which
did involve a breach of promise, remediable in Special Assumpsit, and
for which the object of the action was the recovery of Damages and
not a Specific Sum Certain, as required in Debt. This is but another
way of saying that, as of that time, an Executory Contract, if of sufficient solemnity to be recognized, was regarded as a grant or an

obligation, and not as a contract, as we now understand it-this was
to come later.
It follows from the foregoing discussion that when there is what
192

Cro. Car. 193.
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we now refer to as a Contract in the early Common-Law sense, there
is a Simple (Executed) Contract which involves the performance of
meritorious services by one party for the benefit of another. Even if
there be a promise in such case, as there often may be, the Action of
Debt which lies, is not grounded upon that promise; indeed, if only a
promise existed, without the delivery of some benefit from the plaintiff
to the defendant, Debt could not be sustained.
(III) Debt and Special Assumpsit, While Sometimes Concurrent
Remedies, are Grounded on Different Theories.-It was for this very
reason that Special Assumpsit was, as we shall see later, developed as
a remedy whereby a plaintiff might recover Damages for the breach of
an express promise, as in the sale of goods, the loan of money, or the
rendition of services of value to the defendant. Special Assumpsit
may be concurrent with Debt, where over and above the Simple Executed Contract, performed on one side but not on the other, there is
also an Express Promise to Pay, but, in general, the action lies in many
factual situations wherein no debt exists. Where concurrent, it should
be observed, that the theory upon which each action proceeds, is different. Debt lies upon the Contract, as conceived by the Common
Law, long prior to the emergence of the Modern Contract as an incident of the development of Special Assumpsit, and under which the
plaintiff seeks recovery of the equivalent of the benefit or quid pro quo
which has passed to the defendant. In such case Debt proceeds independently of any promise to pay, and not upon any promise; Special
Assumpsit proceeds upon the theory of the Breach of an Express
Promise, and its occasional concurrence with Debt may be attributed
to its presence over and above a Simple (Executed) Contract as known
under the early Common Law. If a promise is essential to recovery
Debt will not lie. This was made clear in Hersey v. Northern Assurance Co.,19 3 in which the plaintiff sought to recover in two Common

Counts. in Indebitatus Assumpsit, which became a substitute for Debt,
upon a fire insurance policy, under which the Insurance Company
undertook to indemnify against loss by fire. The Court held that Debt
or Indebitatus Assumpsit would not lie, as the Allegations of Fact,
aside from the Express Promise to idemnify in case of loss by fire,
were not sufficient to create a Common-Law Debt-a Debt created by
a Simple (Executed) Contract. Said the Court: "In the present case
the facts aside from the promise, viz.: the plaintiff's ownership of the
property, its destruction by fire without his fault-even the payment
193 75 Vt. 441, 56 At. 95 (1903).
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of the premiums,-do not raise an implied promise by the defendant
to pay; it is only the fact that it promised, upon certain conditions, to
pay, that makes it liable. Consequently, at Common Law, the promise,
the conditions, and the fulfillment of the conditions, must be set forth
-in other words the Count must be special."' 9 4 And the same rule
applies in the case of a wager, a breach of warranty, or where the
vendor fails to deliver the goods to the vendee.' 95 In all such cases,
nothing of value having passed to the defendant, no debt has been
created, or no causa debendi making it his duty to pay; the remedy in
such case is Special Assumpsit for the breach of an express promise. 96
Executory Contracts
WHERE a person promises to perform a certain act and then fails
to perform, there is no basis for supporting an Action of Debt. There
is no Simple (Executed) Contract, no Specialty Contract, no Judgment
and no Statute. The only operative fact fixing liability of the contractor is his breach of promise. At Common Law, there were two reasons
why a mere Breach of Promise would not support an Action of Debt.
In the first place, at Common Law, the breach of a parol promise, while
a lie, and hence immoral, was not regarded as a civil wrong, and therefore there was no remedy provided for breach of a parol promise; in
short, the wrong was of such a character as to be not justiciable. However, by a long process of development which extended from Walton
v. Brintkh97 in 1400, up to Cook and Songate's Case95 in 1588, the
Action of Special Assumpsit, as a remedy for the Breach of Parol
Promises, was created by extending the tort Action of Trespass on
the Case Super Se Assumpsit into the Modern Field of Contract, thus
194 Hersey v. Northern Assurance Co., 75 Vt. 441, 56 AtI. 95 (1903), citing as
authority the leading English case of Cutter v. Powell, 2 SmirH's LEADING CASES
8 (13th ed. London 1929).
'95 Atkinson v. Bell, 8 B. & C. 277, 108 Eng. Rep. 1046 (1828).
And this is still the rule even after the Abolition of the Common Law Actions under
the Codes. See Henry Glass & Co. v. Misrock, 210 App. Div. 783, 206 N.Y. Supp. 373
(1924) modified in 239 N. Y. 475, 147 N. E. 71 (1924).
196 "But the distinction between Debt and Assumpsit is fundamental. For while
Assumpsit might always be brought where Debt would lie upon a Simple Contract, the
converse is not true. There were many cases where Assumpsit was the only remedy.
Assumpsit would lie both where the plaintiff had incurred a detriment upon the faith
of the defendant's promise, and where the defendant had received a benefit. Debt would
lie only in the latter class of cases. In other words, Debt could be brought only upon
a Real Contract, Assumpsit upon any parol contract." Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to
Assumpsit, 8 HARv. L. Rav. 252 (1894).
197 Y. B. 2 Henry IV, 3b (1400).
198 4 Leo. 31, 74 Eng. Rep. 708.
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filling the lacuna or gap which has been described as a deficiency in
the Common Law Scheme of Remedial Justice. 9 ' But this development in no way affected the Nature or Scope of Debt. In the second
place, Special Assumpsit, as the remedy for the Breach of a Promise,
was not proprietary in character, the injury to the deceived promisee
could not be treated, as in Debt, as a specific res, of either chattels or
money, in the possession of the wrongdoer. If the promisor-defendant
was to pay for his breach by making reparation in Damages, it had
to be on some other theory than that which existed in Debt, as Debt
could not be used as a remedy to recover Damages for a Breach of
Contract, without destroying its character as a Real Action.
(I) The Common Law Versus the Modern Law Meaning of the
Term "Contract".-As previously suggested, at Common Law, when
it was said that Debt lies on a Simple Contract, it was used to describe
transactions not included within the term "Contract" as understood in
Modern Law. Originally, it was used in a very narrow sense and to
describe a Real Contract, under which the defendant was, by operation
of law, placed under a duty to recompense the plaintiff in a sum
equivalent in value to the quid pro quo received. The Specialty Contract, by way of contrast, was described as a Covenant, Grant or
Obligation, but not as a Contract. As Professor James Barr Ames observes: "A Simple Contract Debt, as well as a Debt by Specialty, was
originally conceived of, not as a Contract in the Modern Sense of the
Term, that is, as a Promise, but as a Grant. A bargain and sale and
a loan were exchanges of values. The Action of Debt, as several
writers have remarked, was a Real 0 0 rather than a Personal Action.
The Judgment was not for Damages, but for the Recovery of the Debt
as a res.2 0
Such a view of the Common-Law Conception of Contract excludes
those factual situations where the defendant's obligation is founded on
a mere promise to perform, unaccompanied by the receipt of a quid
pro quo. The word "Contract" meant an Executed Contract, under
which a res passed from the plaintiff to the defendant. If the undertaking was executory, or dependent alone upon a promise, with provi199 Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 84 (1809).
200 According to BouviR, LAW DIcmoIARY, P. 660, (3rd Rev. Philadelphia 1914)
"Real Contracts are those in which it is necessary that there be something more than
mere consent, such as a loan of money, deposit or pledge, which from their nature require
a delivery of the thing, res.
201 See article, The History of Assumpsit, No. 59, reprinted in 3 SELECT ESSAYS ON
AsNGLO-AmrEsICAN LEGAL HISTORY, Pt. VI, Contracts, 259 (Boston 1909).
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sion for mutual exchange of benefit, Debt would not lie. Thus, cases
involving suretyship or warranty, were not referred to as contract.
And this explains why, as late as 1629, in the case of Sands v. Trevelian,2 2 the Court held that a Contract of Guaranty was unenforceable
in an Action of Debt, as the guarantor had received no quid pro quo
from the promisee. In consequence, even unto this day, Debt will not
lie for the mere Breach of a Promise, and this remains true even where
the consideration itself creates an obligation to restore it if the promise
be not performed, as where there is a payment on account for goods
sold,"' and there is a failure of delivery. In such case the money paid
constitutes a debt for which Debt will lie; but any loss resulting from
the failure of the sale is remediable only in Special Assumpsit for
Damages, as opposed to a Sum Certain as required in Debt. And, of
course, as previously observed, the exchange of Mutual Promises, does
not create a Contract upon which Debt will lie, as there is no quid pro
quo passing to the defendant; there is, however, a Contract in the
Modern Sense, upon the Breach of which Special Assumpsit will lie.
(II) Debt Not Available Upon a Collateral Contractr-The
Common-Law Rule was that Debt would not lie upon a Collateral
Promise to pay the Debt of Another,104 a principle established at an
early period in the English law. Thus, Reeves, in his History of English Law,'05 commenting on the changes in legal proceedings between
the time of William the Conqueror (1066-1087) and that of King John
(1199-1216), declared: "When they (the parties) were both in Court,
then it was to be considered how the demand arose. This might be of
various kinds, as ex causa mutui, upon a borrowing; ex causa venditionis, upon a sale; ex commodato, ex deposito, upon a deposit or by
some other cause, by which a debt arose; for at this time all matters
of Personal Contract were considered as binding only in the light of
debts; and the only means of recovery, in a Court, was by this action
of debt." In each of these cases the common characteristic was that
the consideration passed from the creditor to the debtor, so that the
Cro. Car. 193, 70 Eng. Rep. 769.
203 See Maryland v. Kister, Moore 711, 72 Eng. Rep. 857 (1598), in which the
Court of Queen's Bench held that Special Assumpsit was not available upon a promise
to pay for goods sold and delivered, "because Debt properly lay, and not an action on
the case [Special Assumpsit], the matter proving a perfect sale and contract."
204 "Thus, in one of the oldest cases upon the subject, 18 Edw. III, 13 (1344), it
is said: 'If A bought of me certain goods for a certain sum, and B at the same time
undertook to pay for them at the day if D did not; if A should not pay for them, debt
could not be brought against B, because it would sound in Covenant."' BEASLEY, C. J.,
in Gregory v. Thompson, 31 N. J. L. 166, 168 (1865).
202

205 1 HisToRY
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contract of the party receiving the quid pro quo, or benefit, was to pay
his own debt and not that of another. Such transactions were in no
way connected with third parties; the debtor was the party securing
the benefit, he alone owed the debt and Debt lay only against him.
In view of this origin of the action, it is not surprising to find that
the doctrine set out above had no application; and Debt, as a remedy,
had no application, in case of a Breach of Promise to pay money which
was primarily due from a third party. In an early case, the law was
stated as follows: "If C recover £10 against A, and B shall say to C
that if he will release the £10 to A he will be his debtor, and accordingly the £10 are released to A, an Action of Debt will not lie against
B, as this sounds in Covenant."" 6 In the subtle theory of the day it
was held that such a promise by B did not create a debt; the party
originally liable, A, remained the debtor, C, who made himself a Surety
did not by that act impose upon himself a debt, but a Collateral Assumption, remediable, if at all, in Special Assumpsit, but certainly not
an obligation which could be enforced by an Action of Debt.
It thus appears that the existence of this ancient rule of law has
never been denied, although Chief Justice Beasley, in Gregory v.
Thompson,20 7 suggests that in some instances it has been misapplied.
He refers specifically to the Anonymous20 case, elsewhere discussed,
in which it was held that an Action of Debt brought by the payee of a
Bill of Exchange against the acceptor, could not be supported, on
the ground that the engagement was collateral. But, said Chief Justice
Beasley, the fact that the decision in Hardres has been overruled in
this country, in no way affected the principal doctrine, as the ground
of reversal, as applied to Negotiable Instruments, did not rest 'on
grounds which involved the doctrine under elucidation. Chitty, a
modern English authority, sustains the ancient doctrine, declaring:
"Where a Simple Contract creates a Collateral Liability, as for the
payment of the debt of a third person, Debt not being sustainable,
Assumpsit is the only Form of Action.120 D The same rule has found
9 Henry IV, 14, pl. 23 (1421).
31 N. J. L. 166 (1865).
208 Hardres 485, 145 Eng. Rep. 568 (1683).
In Bishop v. Young, 2 Bos. & P. 78, 126 Eng. Rep. 1166 (1800), Lord Eldon
reviewed the Anonymous Case reported in Hardres, and held that it rested on solid
ground; and it was also treated with like respect by justice Laurence in Priddy v.
Henbrey, 1 B. & C. 674, 107 Eng. Rep. 248 (1823).
206
207

209 1
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sanction in America in Pierce v. Crafts21 and Wilmarth v. Craw-

ford,2 ' and the principle is not affected because the engagement sued
upon has been expressed in an instrument under seal. This very issue
was presented in 1838 in the case of Randall v. Rigby, 212 in which
Debt was brought upon an indenture whereby A had granted to B
and C certain lands in fee simple, reserving to himself and his heirs
forever an annual rent, and B and C had covenanted that they or one
of them, or some one of their heirs, would pay the rent. The Declaration alleged that one of the stipulated installments of rent was unpaid.
A brought Debt against C, and a Demurrer to the Declaration was
sustained, the Court holding that Covenant under which the defendant
C, jointly with another, had undertaken to secure the payment of an
annuity issuing out of the land, was Collateral, and hence would not
support an Action of Debt.2 13 Finally Chief Justice Beasley refused
to follow Mr. Justice Story's suggestion in Bullard v. Bell,214 that it
would not be overstraining the doctrine of Debt to apply it to Collateral Undertakings to pay a sum certain.
(III) A Single Quid Pro Quo Will Not Create Two Debts.--As
previously observed, Debt was not available against a defendant if
a benefit was conferred on a third person even though at the defendant's request, as there was no quid pro quo essential to create a debt.
According to a case decided in 1545,215 however, it was established
that whatever constituted a quid pro quo, when rendered to the defendant himself would constitute a quid pro quo if delivered to a third
person, provided it was delivered at the defendant's request and that
such third person did not become liable therefor to the plaintiff, as one
quid pro quo could not give rise to two debts.216 This was the principle
on which Slandois v. Simson2 17 was decided, a woman being held
liable in Debt by a tailor for embroidering a gown for the maid of her
daughter.
210 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 90 (1815).
211 10

Vend. (N. Y.) 341 (1833).

212 4 M. & W. 130, 150 Eng. Rep. 1372 (1838).
213 See, in this connection, Harrison v. Mathews, 10 M. & W. 767, 152 Eng. Rep.
682 (1842).
214 1 Mason (U. S.) 292 (1816).
215 27 Henry VIII, 9,-19'(1535).

216 Marriott v. Lister, 2 Wils. (K. B.) 144, 95 Eng. Rep. 731 (1762).
217 Cro. Eliz. 880, 78 Eng. Rep. 1104 (1602). To the same effect, was Sands v.
Trevelian, Cro. Car. 193, 79 Eng. Rep. 769 (1629).
The principle was said to be misapplied in Anonymous, Hardres 485, 145 Eng. Rep.
566 (1638).
See, also, Stoneham v. Bodwill, T. Raym. 67, 84 Eng. Rep. 37 (1663), in which the
action was Indebitatus Assumpsit instead of Debt.
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(IV) The Statute of Frauds and the Rule that Debt will Not Lie
Upon a Collateral Promise.-The principle that Debt will not lie on
a Collateral Promise to pay money primarily due from another is
vital when it comes to the application of the Fourth Section of the
Statute of Frauds, 218 which provided that "no action shall be brought
upon a promise to answer for the debt of another unless the agreement
shall be in writing." The Statute would, of course, have no application except where the promise to pay the debt of another was Collateral and was in Writing. 21 8
The Mode of Declaring on Simple Contracts
W -EE the action is brought on a Simple Contract Debt, the
Declaration must show the Consideration on which such Contract was
founded with exactitude, and it must appear that there is a liability
established either by law or by an express agreement of the defendant.
The Form of the Statement should be that the defendant agreed to
pay the debt, and not that he promised; the basis of the action being
the receipt of value and the duty arising from an Executed Consideration, and not, as in Special Assumpsit, from the promise.22
The Indebitatus Count in Debt differs from those in Indebitatus
Assumpsit; for, although it states that the defendant was indebted to
the plaintiff in a named sum of money "for goods sold," etc., precisely
as in Indebitatus Assumpsit, and it is not necessary to set forth the
nature or particulars of the transaction in detail, yet no promise should
be stated, as in Assumpsit. The quantum meruit and quantum valebant Counts were formerly used in Debt, and resembled those in Assumpsit, except the words "agreed to pay" were used, instead of
"promised to pay."
VII. DECLARATION IN DEBT-ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS:
(3) DEBT ON A SPECIALTY
THE third variety of Debt was Debt on a Specialty, or upon an
instrument under seal, which in the English law was know as a Formal
218 29 Car. 11 (1677). See, also, on this point, article by Ames, Parol Contract Prior
to Assurnpsit, 8 HARv. L. REV. 252 (1895); Hening, A NeV and Old Reading on the
Fourth Section of the Statute of Frauds, 57 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 611 (1909).
The whole Doctrine as to Collateral Promises to Pay exercised a restraining influence

on the issue which long divided the Courts as to whether the Actions of Debt and
Indebitatus Assumpsit should be extended to permit recovery for debts created by Bills
of Exchange and Promissory Notes.
219 Rozier v. Rozier, 2 Vent. 36, 86 Eng. Rep. 293 (1681).
101 (1848).
220 McGinnity v. Laguerenne, 10 Ill.
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Contract. It fixed an obligation in either one of two forms: (1) such
an instrument might create and declare an indebtedness as a presently
existing fact; or (2) it might impart an obligation to do some act, such
as the payment of money, or the discharge of some public trust, in
the future. Regardless of whether the instrument took on a present
or future aspect, if the obligation created was to render a specific,
certain sum of money to the promisee or obligee, the Action of Debt
lay to recover the specific res mentioned in the instrument and as indicated by the instrument to be the property of the obligee to whom
payment is thereby assured. As the implications of an instrument
creating a Personal Obligation under a Seal were different from those
created by a Future Obligation under Seal, each will be considered
separately.
A Sealed Instrument Fixing a Present Obligation
SEALED instruments creating a Present Obligation might take the
form of a contract or bond to pay a specific sum of money, as on a
single or common money bond, without any conditions, or they may
take the form of a bond with a penalty or with a Collateral condition.
In each case the debt was created by the act of the parties to be
charged in executing the instrument under seal which is the basis of
the suit. Thus, where a bond is drawn in the convention form and for
the purpose of securing the payment of money, it purports and acknowledges that the obligor or the person signs and seals the instrument is "to be held and firmly bound to the said" obligor, or the said
"plaintiff" in a specific and certain sum of money, which is to be paid
to the said plaintiff (obligor), or his personal representatives at once
or upon demand or at some fixed date or upon the happening ofsome
contingent act or event. The phrase "to be held and firmly bound to
the said plaintiff," as it appears in the Declaration imports an obligation on the part of the obligor to render the specific thing-the indebtedness-to the obligee, and such language executed under seal
amounts to a conclusive declaration by the person who thus acknowledges his indebtedness that he has in possession money which belongs
to the obligee and which he ought to deliver to him. If the obligor
fails to perform the duty to pay, as undertaken under seal, an Action of
Debt on the bond lies to recover the money specified in the instrument,
the theory being that the obligee or plaintiff is the owner of the
specific sum designated and hence is merely seeking that which belongs
to him as provided in the bond. And such an acknowledgment under
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seal of indebtedness by the obligor is conclusive, even where there
was in fact no pre-existing debt, or where the debtor-obligor had no
property which belonged to the obligee. The reason for this was that
such an acknowledgement of indebtedness, when widened by the
solemn act of sealing, operated as an estoppel, at least in a Court of
Law; and it had the practical effect of barring the obligor from denying what he had previously so solemnly admitted, thus placing the
matter beyond dispute and eliminating any necessity of inquiry as
to the nature and origin of the debt; and in short, under such an obligation, the issue as to how the debt arose, became immaterial.
(I) Bonds with a Penalty or with a Collateral Condition.-By
reason of the peculiar characteristics of the seal instrument creating
a present obligation, it became possible for the obligee to use this
form of obligation for purposes other than the payment of the sum
certain or debt as specified in the contract. Thus, suppose B, the obligor, executes a bond agreeing to pay the obligee, A, a certain sum
of money. In effect the instrument becomes evidence of an absolute
indebtedness. Now, suppose there is added to this instrument a condition in the form of a clause providing that the entire instrument should
be void if the debtor-obligor, B, performs some other act, such as
agreeing to indemnify the obligee against certain contingencies, assuming liability for some third person, conducting himself in the proper
and legal manner in some public office, paying a smaller sum of money
or performing a collateral contract. If the obligor, B, whose performance has thus been promised under a solemn seal, performs the
conditions set forth in the contract, such, for example, if he pays the
smaller amount, or complies with any other condition, there is compensation to the obligee for the anticipated misadventure, or the
condition is said to have been fulfilled, with the result that there is
nothing due on the bond; that is, the bond is void. If, however, the
obligor, B, fails in any manner to meet the conditions as set forth,
the bond is converted to an obligation as absolute in character as it
was upon its original execution, with the result that the obligee, A, may
sue in Debt to recover the sum specified as a conclusively acknowledged debt.
In such an instance, what the bond secured was not the sum certain as a debt, but an agreed penalty or Liquidated Damages for
failure to do something other than paying the debt. Thus, it becomes
apparent that the obligor's acknowledgement of an obligation to pay
a specific sum, was, in reality "a cloak to disguise a collateral under-
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taking; and when the obligee sues on the bond for the amount therein
acknowledged to be due, what he actually goes for is not a debt but
Damages for the nonperformance of the contract contained in the
condition." 22 ' And under the Common Law, as the Breach of a Condi-

tion operated as a conversion of the indebtedness into an absolute
obligation, the obligee, A, recovered the full amount prescribed by
the deed, in total disregard as to the circumstances under which or the
reason why the obligor failed to perform or the extent of the Damage
suffered by the obligee B, which, in some instances, was outrageously
small. Thus, to illustrate, suppose B, the obligor, by bond, acknowledges an indebtedness to A, the obligee, of $10,000, with a condition
that the bond is to be void upon the payment of $5,000 on a day
certain. If, for any reason, whatsoever, B failed to pay on the specified
date, the larger amount becomes absolutely due. And, if thereafter,
the obligor offered to pay the smaller sum, the amount, let us say,
actually owed, his tender was of no avail.
(A) The Peculiar and Technical Problems Involved in Debt
Upon a Bond with Condition.-As the Pleadings in Debt upon a bond
are and were somewhat peculiar and technical, until modified by
statute, it may be well to have before us, for illustration purposes, the
Forms of the Declaration and Subsequent Pleadings in such an
Action. They appear below:
PLEADINGS IN AN ACTION OF DEBT UPON A BOND
DECLARATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
J'OHN DOE, Plaintiff,
Ov.

RIcHARD ROE

1

At Law, No. 54321

Queritur; The plaintiff, John Doe, by his attoriey J. S., sues the
defendant, Richard Roe, for that,
Inducement: Whereas, heretofore, to-wit on the first day of May
in the year 1930, at the city of Washington in the District of Columbia,
the said defendant, by his certain writing obligatory,
Profert-which said writing obligatory is shown to the court now
here, sealed with the seal of the said defendant, the date whereof is
the day and year aforementioned,
Acknowledged himself to be held and firmly bound to the said
221 See KE WIN, CASES IN CoifmoN-LAw PLEADING, c. II, The Common Law
Actions, 47 (2d ed. Rochester 1934).
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plaintiff in the sum of one thousand dollars, to be paid to said plaintiff
by the said defendant when he should be thereunto requested;
Gravamen. Yet the said defendant, although thereunto often
requested (licet saepe requisitus) hath not paid to the said plaintiff
the said sum of one thousand dollars, or any part thereof, but so to do
hath wholly refused and still refuses;
Ad Damnum. To the damage of the said plaintiff in the sum
of one thousand dollars;
Inde producit sectam. And therefore he brings suit:
Conclusion: Claim. And the said plaintiff claims on account
thereof the said sum of one thousand dollars, with interest thereon at
the rate of six per cent per annum from the first of May aforesaid,
together with the costs of this action.
J. S., Attorney for the Plaintiff.
[Endorsed: The Clerk will please file this narr. and issue process
thereon against Richard Roe. J. S., Attorney for Plaintiff.]
PLEA
Oyer. Now comes Richard Roe, the defendant in the above entitled action, by his attorney P. W. (and defends the wrong and injury
alleged, etc.).
Oyer Prayed. And craves oyer of the alleged writing obligatory
mentioned in the declaration herein by the plaintiff filed, and also of
the condition of the said writing obligatory; and the same are read to
him in those words and figures, to-wit:
Bond set out-Obligation. "Know All Men by These Presents,
That I, Richard Roe, am held and firmly bound unto John Doe in the
full sum of one thousand dollars, to be paid to the said John Doe, his
executors, administrators and assigns, for which payment well and
truly be made I bind myself, my heirs, executors and administrators
firmly by these presents. Sealed with my seal, and dated at Washington in the District of Columbia this the first day of May in the year
of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and thirty.
Condition: "Whereas the above-bounden Richard Roe has this
day, by certain articles of contract, bearing date of this day, undertaken and promised to build a certain house for the above-named John
Doe upon land in the said articles designated, and in accordance with
the specifications and terms in the said articles expressed and fully
set forth:
"Now, therefore, if the said Richard Roe shall well and truly build
the said house in accordance with his said promise and undertaking
and in full accordance with the said specifications and terms, then the
foregoing obligation shall be void: otherwise in full force and virtue.
"RicHARD RoE, (Seal.)"
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Plea: Which being read and heard, the said defendant says
(actio, non) that the said plaintiff his action against the said defendant
ought not to have or maintain, because the said defendant says
Body. that heretofore, to wit, on the first day of June in the year
1930, at the city of Washington in the District of Columbia, the said
defendant did build the house which, in the articles of contract mention and referred to in the aforesaid condition of the said writing
obligatory, was designated, provided for and promised to be built;
and the said defendant did build the said house in full accordance
with the terms and specifications expressed and prescribed in the
said articles of contract and in full and exact performance of his,
the said defendant's promise and undertaking and expressed in and by
the said articles of contract;
Verification. and this the said defendant is ready to verify.
P. W., Attorney for the Defendant.
REPLICATION
Commencement. And the said plaintiff, for replication to the plea
by the above-mentioned defendant herein pleaded, says that by reason
of any thing in the said plea alleged, he the said plaintiff (precludi
non) ought not to be barred from having and maintaining his said
action against the said defendant, because the said plaintiff says that
Breach. The said defendant did not well and truly build the said
house in the foregoing condition of the aforesaid writing obligatory
mentioned, and did not build the said house in full accordance with
the specifications and terms in the aforesaid articles of contract expressed and set out; but that the said defendant did fail and make default in such building and in the performance of his promise and
undertaking made and expressed in the said articles of contract, in
this, namely:
Assignment of Breach. Whereas it was and is by the said articles
of contract prescribed, stipulated and agreed, among other things, that
the said defendant should provide and attach shutters at each and
every of the windows of the said house; yet the said defendant did
omit and wholly fail to provide and attach any shutter at each of six
windows of the said house; whereby the plaintiff was obliged at his
own cost to supply shutters for the said six windows; to the damage
of the said plaintiff in the sum of sixty dollars;
Verification. and this the said plaintiff is ready to verify.
J. S., Attorney for the Plaintiff.
REJOINDER
Traverse of Replication. And the said defendant say (actio. non)
that by reason of anything alleged in the replication by the said plaintiff filed in this action, the said plaintiff his action against this -de-
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fendant ought not to have or maintain, because the said defendant says
that he did not omit or fail to provide and attach shutters to the windows of the house in the said replication mentioned, in manner and
form as the plaintiff hath thereof alleged;
Conclusion to the Country. And this the said defendant puts himself upon the country.
P. W., Attorney for the Defendant.
SURREJOINDER
Similiter. And the said plaintiff doth the like.
J. S., Attorney for the Plaintiff.
KEIGWIN, Cases on Common Law Pleading, c. II, Debt, 50
(Rochester 1934).
A glance at the Form set forth above will reveal that in suing
on a Bond with a Condition at Common Law, it was the practice for
the Declaration to set forth the Bond as an Absolute Obligation, without any mention of the Conditon in Discharge, followed by a demand
of the sum acknowledged, or the penalty, as an admitted debt. If the
defendant failed to prove performance of his Collateral Contract, he
craved oyer of the Bond and also of the Condition, as a result of
which he was able to spread upon the Record, as a part of his Plea,
the stipulation discharging the confessed indebtedness if a certain
specified thing was done-as completing the building of a certain
house. Thereafter, the Plea alleged the Performance or Fulfillment
of the Conditon-that he built the house-or performed any other
Condition in the Bond, such, for example, as paying a smaller sum
or saving the plaintiff harmless from some misadventure. At the Replication Stage of the Proceeding the plaintiff Averred some Breach of
the Condition-that the defendant-obligor did not well and truly build
the said house in the manner stipulated, to which, by way of Rejoinder, the defendant filed a Denial, thus bringing the Pleadings to
a Joinder of Issue. If it appeared by Proof that the obligor had in
any manner Breached the Condition, Judgment was entered against
him for the entire amount acknowledged under seal to be due, and
this was the rule even where his default was trivial, such as being
a day late in the performance of the obligation.
(B) The Intervention of Equity to Prevent a Forfeiture.-As
Forfeitures were always regarded by Equity as odious, it is not surprising to find that during the reign of Henry VIII (1509-1549) and
in the early period of his Chancellorship, Sir Thomas Moore made an
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unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Common-Law Judges to mitigate
this practice. He summoned them to a conference concerning the
possibility of granting Relief at Law, particularly where the bond
called for a large sum to secure the payment a much smaller actual
debt. Chancellor Moore proposed that the defendant-obligor, in such
cases, should be allowed to show that he had tendered or paid the debt,
with interest and costs, at a time subsequent to the day prescribed
by the contract, and that he should be held liable only to the extent
of the loss actually sustained by the obligee-plaintiff. But the Judges
were adamant in sustaining the Rule calling for Forfeiture according
to the terms of the instrument. According to Lord Mansfield, in
Wyllie v. Wilkes,22 2 when the Judges said they could not relieve against
the penalty, the Chancellor "swore by the body of God, he would grant
an Injunction." Thereafter it was the practice for a delinquent
obligor to seek relief against a Forfeiture of more than was actually
due by application to Equity, wvhich Court proceeded to ascertain the
actual Damage resulting from his default, decreed that he should be
held liable only to that extent, and issued an Injunction against the
creditor-obligee against executing the judgment, provided the obligor
paid the amount decreed. And this was the background against which
the Statute of William III was enacted in 1696, and which was designed to make the Practice in Equity applicable in Actions at Law on
Bonds. The Statute appears below:
STATUTE OF 8 & 9 WM. III, c. 11, § 8 (1696)
(2 Halsbury'sStatutes 591)
"IN all actions in any Court of Record upon any bond, or on any
penal sum, for non-performance of any covenants or agreements contained in any indenture, deed, or writing, the plaintiff may assign as
many breaches as he shall think fit; and the Jury shall assess not
only such Damges and Costs as have heretofore been usually done,
but also Damages for such of the breaches as the plaintiff upon the
trial of the issues shall prove to have been broken, and the like Judgment shall be entered on such Verdict as heretofore has been usually
done. And if Judgment shall be given for the plaintiff on Demurrer,
or by Confession, or nil dicit, the plaintiff may suggest upon the Roll as
many breaches as he shall think fit; upon which a Writ shall issue to
the Sheriff of the County where the action is brought, to Summons a
222

3 Doug. 519, 523, 99 Eng. Rep. 331, 333 (1790).
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Jury before the Justices of Assize of that County to inquire of the
truth of those breaches and to assess the Damages; in which Writ the
said Justices of Assize shall be commanded to make Return thereof
to the Court from whence the same shall issue at the time mentioned
in such Writ. And in case the defendant, after such Judgment, and
before Execution, shall pay into Court to the use of the plaintiff the
Damages assessed and costs, a stay of Execution shall be entered upon
the Record; or, if by reason of an Execution, the plaintiff shall be fully
paid all the Damages and Costs, and the charges of the Execution, the
defendant's body, lands, or goods, shall be thereupon forthwith discharged from the Execution, which shall likewise be entered upon
Record; but in each case the Judgment shall notwithstanding remain
as a further security, to answer to the plaintiff such Damages as he
may sustain by any further breach of covenant contained in the same
indenture, deed, or writing; upon which the plaintiff may have a scire
facias upon the said Judgment against the defendant, his heirs, terretenants, or executors or administrators, suggesting other breaches of
the said covenants or agreements, and to Summon him or them respectively to show cause why Execution should not be awarded upon
the said Judgment, upon which there shall be the like proceeding as
was in the Action of Debt upon the said bond, for assessing of Damages upon Trial of issues joined upon such breaches, or inquiring
thereof upon a Writ to be awarded in manner aforesaid, and upon payment or satisfaction as aforesaid of such future Damages, Costs, and
Charges as aforesaid, all further proceedings on the Judgment are
again to be stayed, and so toties quoties, and the defendant's body,
land, or goods shall be discharged out of Execution as aforesaid."
(C) The Scope and Effect of the Statute of William III
(1696) .2 ---In order to prevent the injustice to the obligor which resulted in a Forfeiture of the larger amount due upon Breach of the
Condition, although the amount of the real debt was often much
smaller, Parliament by enactment of the Statute of William III in
1696, sought to avoid the circuity of relief where the obligor was
compelled to go to Equity, by providing that:
"In all actions in any Court of Record upon any bond, or on any
penal sum, for non-performance of any covenants or agreements contained in any indenture, deed, or writing, the plainiff may assign as
many Breaches as he shall think fit; and the Jury shall assess not
223 C. 11, 8.
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only such Damages and Costs as have heretofore been usually done,
but also Damages for such of the Breaches as the plaintiff upon the
Trial of the issues shall prove to have been broken, and the like Judgment shall be entered on such Verdict as heretofore has been usually
done."
The Statute further provided that the plaintiff might take Judgment for the penalty fixed by the bond, but that Execution should be
limited to the sum found by the Verdict. As thus enacted the single
object of the Statute was to enable Courts of Law 2to24 do that justice
for which a resort to Chancery had been necessary
But aside from eliminating injustice by preventing a Forfeiture
on the part of the obligor, the statutory provision was also necessary
to preserve the Rules of Pleading, one of which rules is that in Pleading
there must be No Departure, that is, an abandonment at a later state
of pleading, of the ground on which the plaintiff has places his cause
of action or the defendant his defence. Thus, after the Declaration,
every Subsequent Plea must support the First Cause of Action Assigned, or the First Defence that has been Pleaded. To illustrate, and
to show how this principle of pleading applies to our present problem.
Let us suppose that A declares on a common money bond. What can
the defendant, B, plead? He may deny the bond by pleading non est
factum, he may plead duress or fraud, or any other matter going to
defeat the instrument itself. But if the bond is good, the defendant is
placed at a material disadvantage. Assuming the bond is good and was
given with a Special Condition to perform certain covenants or agreements, the defendant, B, is ignorant as to the specific ground of A's
complaint; he does not know in what particular the plaintiff intends
to charge him with a Breach of the Condition, and, of course, he cannot Plead in Bar by way of Confession and Avoidance of any matter
not alleged in the Declaration. In consequence, his only recourse is to
Plead Performance of the Whole Condition; he cannot plead the
General Issue as the plaintiff's cause of action was not as yet complete.
What, then, was the defendant's situation? Having Pleaded Performance, in his Replication he now assigns Breaches of the Condition, thus completing his cause of action. This complaint as to the
Breaches of the Condition now confronts the defendant for the first
See, also, Wilson v. Daniel, 3 Dall.
224 Davis v. Dixon, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 370 (1830).
(U. S.) 401, 1 L. Ed. 655 (1798); Watts v. Camors, 115 U. S. 353, 6 S. Ct. 91, 29 L.
Ed. 406 (1885); Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n. v. Moore, 183 U. S. 642, 22 S. Ct. 240, 46
L. Ed. 366 (1901).
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time, but at a time when he is limited as to the scope of his action; he
cannot place all the plaintiff's allegations in issue by pleading the
General Issue, as the Plea Stage at which that Plea could be entered,
has been passed, and any other Plea he may make must correspond
with his original Plea of Performance, or he will be guilty of a Departure, which was fatal on General Demurrer. The defendant may
be a representative, a surety, or upon inquiry, he may discover that
the principal had a release, or a license, or that there had been an
accord and satisfaction for that breach, but he cannot plead it, as such
a Plea would be inconsistent with his First Plea of Performance; he,
therefore, must stand or fall on that Plea.125 As we shall see, the
Statute avoided any such limitation upon the obligor, by permitting
the Assignment of the Breaches complained of in the Declaration, in
which case the defendant might meet each Breach with such answers
as his Defence required.
(D) The Three Modes of Declaring Under the Statute on Bonds
With Collateral Conditions.-Under the Statute, unless changed by
enactments in a given state, there were three different Modes of Pleading in such cases;2 6
(1) In accordance with the rule which prevailed before the
Statute, the plaintiff may Declare upon the Bond as an Absolute Obligation, without noticing the Condition, in which case the defendant
craves Oyer of the Condition and Pleads Performance, whereupon the
plaintiff Replies by Assigning Breaches, to which the defendant files a
Rejoinder, denying the defaults averred, thus reaching an issue; or
(2) The Plaintiff may Set Out the Condition in the Declaration
and Assign the Breaches thereof, to which the defendant may Plead,
according to the nature of his Defence. The latter method is usually
favored as it avoids an exception to the general rule that a plaintiff
must, in stating a cause of action, allege a Breach in the Declaration.2 27

(3) Finally, there was a third method of declaring which conVan Voork, Adm'x v. The Morris Canal & Banking Co., 20 N. 3. L. 167 (1843).
For a full discussion of the different Modes of Pleading in such cases by
Chancellor Kent, see Munro v. Allaire, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 320 (1805).
And for a later New York case showing wherein the practice under the New York
statute of 1813 (1 R. L. 518, § 7), which was substantially a copy of the English Act
of 8 & 9 Win. III, c. 11, § 8 (1696), was modified by 2 R. L. 378, § 5 (1829). See
Reed v. Drake, 7 Wen. (N. Y.) 345 (1831).
227 The same requirement as to Alleging the Breach prevails in other states. llinois:
Patrick v. Rucker, 19 Ill. 428 (1858) ; McDole v. McDole, 106 I1. 452 (1883) ; Missouri:
Payne v. Snell, 4 Mo. 238 (1834); New York: Van Benthingsen v. Dewit, 4 Johns.
(N. Y.) 213 (1809); Smith v. Jansen, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 115 (1811).
225
226
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sisted of a combination of the two methods as set forth above, 2 8 using
One Count upon the Obligation alone and another Count for Stating
the Condition and Assigning the Breaches thereof.
It should be observed that the word "may" as used in the Statute,
was construed not as permissive but as mandatory, hence it became
settled that the plaintiff was not permitted to proceed as at Common
Law, but somewhere in the Record, Assign the Breaches of Condition,
for which he was seeking Damages 2 9 But if the defendant chose
not to set out the Condition and Plead Performance, but Demurred
to the Declaration or entered some other Defence, such as non est
factum, or if he made Default, and the plaintiff took Judgment, the
plaintiff was nevertheless required to Assign Breaches in a suggestion
filed outside the regular course of pleading; and the plaintiff was not
permitted to take Judgment for the Penalty of the Bond unless his
23
actual Damages were alleged and assessed?
A Sealed Instrument Fixing a Future Obligation
WHERE a sealed instrument contains an agreement to perform a
certain act at a future time, such as to build a house, the promisee
cannot sue the obligor upon any predicate of prior indebtedness; in
such a case Covenant to recover Damages for the breach of the sealed
instrument is the appropriate remedy, as Debt does not lie for an
obligation originating in that manner. If, however, the sealed instrument had provided for the payment in the future of a specified sum
of money, there is a suggestion of a pre-existing duty, the money
promised presumably being in discharge of a present debt, as for a
loan or for goods sold, which constitute a causa debendi?3s By the
mediaeval mind, such a promise was conceived of and treated as a
present Grant of the same, or a transfer of the title to the plaintiffobligee, which created a debt in the present, but a debt which was to
be paid in the future. In other words, B's agreement to pay A a
specific sum of money next year, makes A the owner of that sum at
228 See, for an example of this practice, the case of United States to the use of
Wilson v. Walker, 109 U. S. 258, 3 S. Ct. 277, 27 L. Ed. 927 (1883).
229 See Gainsford v. Griffith, 1 Wins. Saund. 51, 58, n. 1, 85 Eng. Rep. 59, 62 (1667).
230 English: Roles v. Rosewell, 5 T. R. 540, 101 Eng. Rep. 302 (1704); Drage v.
Brand, 2 Wils, (K. B.) 37*7, 95 Eng. Rep. 871 (1767); Federal: United States v. Maloney,
4 App. D. C. 508 (1798).
On the operation of the Statute in general, see Betts v. Burch, 4 H. & N. 506, 157
Eng. Rep. 938 (1859); Beckham v. Drake, 2 H. L. 579, 9 Eng. Rep. 1213 (1849).
231 KEIGWIN, CASES IN CozjmroN LAW PLEADING, c. II, THE COmEON LAW AcTioNs,
53 (2d ed. Rochester 1934).
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once, even though A may make no claim of the property until the day
specified. Thus, in the Early Law, it was thought that an Agreement
by Specialty for the payment of money on a Future Day, in effect,
operated as an immediate transfer of title to the sum mentioned,
whereby the plaintiff-obligee was authorized, upon the arrival of the
date specified, or the event designated, to demand the specified sum
as his own. Debt on Specialty, therefore, is the proper remedy to recover a certain and fixed sum of money, made payable by a sealed
instrument, and which under the language of the engagement, is not
something other than the debt of the obligor. As Professor Keigwin
so truly observes; "When, therefore, Action was brought upon a
Specialty obligating the defendant to a future payment, the plaintiff
did not sue to enforce performance of an Executory Engagement, but
to recover a specific sum to which the title had become vested in him;
he sought, not Damages for breach of an Executory Promise, but
possession of an identical res, demanded as the proper object of a Real
Action, one which had been made his property by an Antecedent
,232
Grant.
The Mode of Declaringin Debt on Specialties
IN Debt on Sealed Instruments the Declaration usually states
the Execution of the Specialty, and makes Profert of it,233 without
any mention of the Consideration on which the Contract was founded.
It is necessary, however, where performance of the Consideration by
the plaintiff is a Condition Precedent to his right to sue, to allege Fulfillment of the Conditions to defendant's liability 2 34 The Statement
of the Specialty must be a correct description of it, as to time, parties,
etc.; and it must appear, either by Express Allegation or by the use
23
of descriptive words importing the fact, that it was under seal. 6 If
not set out verbatim, it must be stated according to its legal operation
232 See article by Keigwin, The Action of Debt, Pt. II, The Nature of the Obligation, 12 GEo. L. J. 28, 35 (1923).
233 Kentucky: Scott v. Curd, Hardin (Ky.) 69 (1806); Cleveland v. Rogers, 1 A.
K. Marsh. (Ky.) 193 (1818); Massachusetts: Bender v. Sampson 11 Mass. 42 (1814).
234 Florida: United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. District Grand Lodge No. 27
of Grand United Order of Odd Fellows, 58 Fla. 373, 50 So. 952 (1909); Illinois: Wash
v. Nash, 16 11. 79 (1854); Caldwell v. Richmond, 64 Ill. 30 (1872); New York: Whitney
v. Spencer, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 39 (1825); Virginia: Nottingham v. Ackiss, 110 Va. 810, 67
S. E. 351 (1910).
235 English: Moore v. Jones, 2 Ld. Raym. 1536, 92 Eng. Rep. 496 (1728); New
York: Van Santwood v. Sandford, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 197 (1813); Vermont: Barrett v.
Carden, 65 Vt. 431, 26 Atl. 530, 36 Am. St. Rep. 876 (1893); West Virginia: Kidd v.
Beckley, 64 W. Va. 80, 60 S.E. 1089 (1908); holding that the making and signing need

not be alleged.
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and effect 2 3 It must appear that the contract was by deed, and it is
a general rule, as we shall hereafter see, that Profert of the deed must
be made, unless it is in possession of the adverse party or lost or
237
destroyed
In an Action upon a Penal Bond, it was formerly the practice
for plaintiff to set out only the defendant's obligation to pay the penalty, without mentioning the Condition subsequent which it was the
object of the bond to enforce. The defendant would then crave Oyer
of the Condition and Plead Performance, and the defendant would
Reply, Assigning Breaches of the Condition. 3 8 Upon a Penal Bond
the Real Cause of Action is the Breach of the Condition Subsequent.
It is in effect a Covenant to Perform the Condition of the Bond. The
Action is only in Form for a Debt, which is recited by way of
penalty, and in reality is an Action for Damages for Breach of Contract, and only the Actual Damages can now be collected.
By statute the plaintiff is usually required to Assign the Breaches
Complained of in his Declaration, and the defendant may then meet
them in his Pleas. Although Judgment may still be entered for the
penalty of the bond, this stands merely as security for the Damages
239
caused by the Breach of Condition as found by the Jury.
VIII.

DECLARATION IN DEBT-ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS: (4) DEBT UPON STATUTES

In General
is the proper remedy to recover a Specific Sum of Money
Due by Virtue of a statute, where the statute prescribes no particular
Form of Action 4 ° Thus, where a statute prohibits the doing of an
act under a certain penalty prescribed by the act, to be recovered either
DEBT

236 Illinois: White v. Thomas, 39 Ill. 227 (1866) ; Massachusetts: Lent v. Padelford,
10 Mass. 235, 6 Am. Dec. 110 (1813) ; New York: Scott v. Lieber, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 479
(1829); Vermont: Barrett v. Carden, 65 Vt. 431, 26 At. 530, 36 Am. St. Rep. 876
(1893).
237 Massachusetts: Bender v. Sampson, 11 Mass. 42 (1814). See, also, Conwell v.
Clifford, 45 Ind. 392 (1873).
238 New Jersey: Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Van Voorst, 20 N. J. L. 167
CASES ON
(1843); West Virginia: Reynolds v. Hurst, 18 W. Va. 648 (1881). WlrVnTT,
COMMoN-LAW PLEADING, 337, 388, 389, note (St. Paul 1916).
239 Patrick v. Rucker, 19 Ill. 428, 439 (1858), (Condition must be set out and
Breaches Assigned.)
240 ComyIN, DIGEST or THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Action on Statute, E (5th ed. Philadelphia 1824-1826); BACON, ABRIDGM=T OF T= LAW, Debt, A (5th ed., London 1797);
English: Tilson v. Town of Warwick Gaslight Co., 4 B. & C. 962, 107 Eng. Rep. 1317
(1825).
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by the party aggrieved, or by an informer,2 41 and provides nio particular mode of recovery, Debt will lie.24 2 Such a statute, in effect,
provides that a specific sum of money or a specific chattel which
now belongs to a certain person shall become the property of another;
or the effect of such a statute is to create in the latter of these two
persons a title to the thing transferred, and to cast upon the former
of these two persons a legal obligation to surrender it to the other. 43
For example, a statute may provide as a penalty, for violation of a
statute prohibiting fishing, hunting or smuggling, that the offender
shall make profert of the instruments used in committing the wrongful
act, such as a boat, fishing equipment, horse or weapon, or other
materials involved in the violation of the revenue laws. Such statutes
customarily provide that the Forfeited Articles shall pass to the informer, to the officer detecting the offence, or to the Government,the effect of such provision being to transfer to such person the title
to the property in question. Upon the violation of this type of statute,
the property of the offender is held without any further right to the
offender, but as the property of the person to whose benefit it accrues
under the terms of the statute. The same rule applies where the statute
provides for the Forfeiture of a certain sum of money, the pecuniary
amount as a penalty being assimilated to a corporeal chattel, the title to
which, by force of the statute, has passed from the wrongdoer to the
person designated to take under the Statute. The aggrieved person,
whether a Private Informer, or a Government officer, in suing on such
a penalty, acts on the theory that he owes the money or ,other things
Forfeited, which the offender is obligated to surrender to its new proprietor, the statute constituting a causa debendi 44
241 When a penal statute gives the whole or a part of a penalty to a common informer, and enables him generally to sue for the same, Debt will lie, and he need not
declare qui tam (I CmrrY, TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES TO ACTIONS WITH
PRECEDENTS AND FoRms, c. II, 126 (16th Am. ed. by Perkins, Springfield 1876); but
there must be an express provision enabling an informer to sue. Rex v. Malland, 2 Str.
828, 93 Eng. Rep. 877 (1728); Fleming v. Bailey, 5 East 313, 102 Eng. Rep. 1090
(1804).
242 1 Rolle, Abridgment, 598, pls. 18, 19 (London 1668). See, also, the following
cases: English: Underhill v. Ellicombe, 1 McCle. & Yo. 457, 148 Eng. Rep. 489 (1825);
Alabama: Rogers v. Brooks, 99 Ala. 31, 11 So. 753 (1892); Illinois: Vaughan v.
Thompson, 15 111. 39 (1853); Ewbanks v. President, etc. of Town of Ashley, 36 Ill.
177 (1864); President, etc., of Town of Jacksonville v. Block, 36 Ill. 507 (1865);
Michigan: Benalick v. People, 31 Mich. 200 (1875); Federal: Cross v. United States, 1
Gall. 26, Fed. Cas. No. 3,434 (1812).
243 KEIGWIN, CASES IN COmmON LAW PLEADING, II, The Common Law Actions,
44 (2d ed. Rochester 1934).
244 Whitecroft v. Vanderver, 12 Ill. 235 (1850).
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Debt will also lie to recover, under a statute, money lost and paid
on a wager, or to recover usury paid, or to recover a delinquent tax,2 45
or a stockholder in a bank where, by statute, such person is obligated
to pay all the debts of the business, or a specific portion thereof 4 6
And whenever a statute gives the right to recover damages for any particular injury, as for waste, extortion, etc., and the Damages are
ascertained by the act, and are not uncertain, Debt will lie to recover
them, if the statute prescribes no other remedy.2 4
Where, however, the statute giving the right to sue for a penalty,
or other debt created by it, prescribes a specific remedy for its reform of
covery, other than Debt, the Action of Debt will not lie; the
2 48
remedy.
exclusive
the
as
regarded
then
action provided is
The Mode of Declaringin Debt Upon Statutes
IN Debt on a Statute at the suit of the party aggrieved, or by a
Common Informer, the statement should embrace all the material facts
to show that the offence or act charged against the defendant was
within its provisions. All circumstances necessary to support the
action must be alleged, but it is sufficient if these be substantially set
forth, and the precise words of the statute need not be used 49 If there
245 Ryan v. Gallatin County, 14 IM. 78 (1852); Town of Geneva v. Cole, 61 Ill.
397 (1871); People, to Use of Christian County v. Davis, 112 111. 272 (1884); People
637, 113 N. E. 934 (1916). A suit in Debt for taxes is not an action
v. Dummer, 274 Ill.
upon a contract, express or implied, under the Chicago Municipal Court Act. See, also,
United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37, 34 S. Ct. 213, 58 L. Ed. 494 (1914).
246 Mills v. Scott, 99 U. S. 29 (1878).
247 "Whenever a statute gives a right to recover Damages, reduced, pursuant to the
provisions of such statute, to a sum certain, an Action of Debt lies, if no other specific
remedy is provided for. Bigelow v. Cambridge, etc., Turnpike Corp., 7 Mass. 202
(1810)." See, also, Alabama: Blackburn v. Baker, 7 Port. (Ala.) 284 (1838); Strange
v. Powell, 7 Port. (Ala.) 284 (1838); Illinois: Israel v. President, etc., of Town of
461 (1840);
Jacksonville, 1 Scam. (Ill.) 290 (1836); Cushing v. Dill, 2 Scam. (Ill.)
39 (1853); Kentucky: Portland Dry Dock & Ins. Co. v.
Vaughan v. Thompson, 15 Ill.
Trustees of Portland, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 77 (1851).
And in Reed v. Davis, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 514 (1829), where a statute gave the remedy
by an Action of Debt generally to recover penalties and forfeitures prescribed by the
statute, it was held that Debt would lie to recover Treble Damages for Waste given by
the statute, though it is evident that the amount was neither ascertained nor certain.
248 English: Stevens v. Evans, 2 Burr. 1151, 1157, 97 Eng. Rep. 761, 763 (1761);
Underhill v. Ellicombe, 1 McClel. & Yo. 450, 148 Eng. Rep. 489 (1825) ; Illinois: Confrey
v. Stark, 73 IlM.187 (1874); Massachusetts: Smith v. Drew, 5 Mass. 514 (1809); Gedney
v. Inhabitants of Tewksbury, 3 Mass. 307 (1807); New Hampshire: Smith v. Woodman, 28 N. H. 520 (1854); New York: Almy v. Harris, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 175 (1809).
249 A Declaration to Recover Damages given by a Special Statute should embrace all
the material elements of the statute. Henniker v. Contoocook Valley R. Co., 29 N. H.
146 (1854). See, also, the following cases: Alabama: Gunter v. Dale County, 44 Ala. 639
(1870) ; Rogers v. Brooks, 99 Ala. 31, 11 So. 753 (1892); Maine: Berry v. Stinson, 23
Me. 140 (1843); Massachusetts: Hall v. Bumstead, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 2 (1838); New
York: Brown v. Harmon, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 508 (1856).

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VoL. 4

is an Exception or Proviso incorporated in the Enacting Clause of the
statute and part of it, the plaintiff must show that the defendant is
not within the Exception; but, if the Exception is contained in a Subsequent Clause, it is a matter of Defense only.250 In Framing the
Declaration, it is necessary to conclude with the words, "against the
form of the statute" or "statutes," in order to show, on the face of the
Record, that the Action is Founded on the Statute.25 1

IX. DECLARATION IN DEBT-ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS:
(5) DEBT UPON JUDGMENT
In General
IN a Court of Record, according to a "formulary of immemorial
usage,"' 52 a Final Judgment declares that "it is considered that the
plaintiff do have and recover of the defendant" a certain sum of money
or a specific chattel; that is, the Judgment merely determines the
matter of right between the parties, under which the plaintiff is to regain something which already belongs to him and which is wrongfully
possessed by the defendant. What the language of the Judgment imports, and what the Judgment does, is to establish the plaintiff's title
to a specific chattel or to a certain sum of money, to the plaintiff.
In like manner, a Recognizance, whereby one person enters upon the
Records of a Court, acknowledging his indebtedness to another, may
be treated creating as a legal obligation on the part of the defendant to
pay the debt admitted to be due. And so, in any case where the indebtedness is evidence by an Irrefutable Record, the Action of Debt,
because of its proprietary character, was peculiarly appropriate as a
remedy whereby the plaintiff could recover chattels or money manifested to be his property.
Thus, a Judgment for a sum of money adjudged by the court
to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff in any Former Action is
a Debt of Record; that is, a sum of money which appears to be due
by the evidence of a Court of Record. This is an obligation of the

250 English: Jones v. Axen, 1 Ld. Raym. 120, 91 Eng. Rep. 976 (1696); Illinois:
Whitecraft v. Vanderver, 12 i11. 235 (1850); Maine: Smith v. Moore, 6 Greenl. (Me.)
278 (1830), and cases there cited; New York: Hart v. Cleis, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 41 (1811);
Federal: Smith v. United States, 1 Gall. 261, Fed. Cas. No. 13,122 (1812).
251 English: Wells v. Iggulden, 5 Dowl. & Ry. 13, 107 Eng. Rep. 703 (1824);
Connecticut: Town of Barkhamsted, v. Parsons, 3 Conn. 1 (1807); Maine: Penley v.
Whiting, 48 Me. 351 (1861); Massachusetts: Peabody v. Hayt, 10 Mass. 36 (1813);
Federal: Cross v. United States, 1 Gall. 26, Fed. Cas. No. 3,434 (1812).
252 See KIwGwn, CAsEs 3n CommoN-LAw PLEADING, Bk. I, The Forms of Action,
II, The Common Law Actions, Debt Upon Records, 45 (2d ed. Rochester, 1934).
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highest nature, being established by the adjudication of a Court of
Record. An Action of Debt was the only means for the enforcement
of a Judgment after a Year and a Day had elapsed from the time
of its recovery. After such time Execution could not issue thereon,
as the Judgment was presumed to be satisfied. So that, if one has
once obtained a Judgment against another for a certain sum, and neglects to take out Execution thereupon, he may afterwards bring an
Action of Debt upon this Judgment, and shall not be put upon the
Proof of the Original Cause of Action; but, upon showing the Judgment once obtained, still in force, and yet unsatisfied, he is entitled
to a New Judgment for the debt.
DistinctionBetween Suing in Debt on a Judgment Rendered in a Court
of Record and a Court Not of Record
WE have seen that Debt lies on any obligation of Record to pay
money. 53 But not all Records are of equal effect. The effect of a
Domestic Judgment rendered in a Court Not of Record25 was different from that of a Judgment rendered in a Court of Record, which,
as we shall see, is regarded as a Specialty. 55 And the situation is
complicated by the fact that under Article IV, Section 1 of our Federal Constitution, each state is required to give Full Faith and Credit
to the Judgment rendered in Courts of Record in any other state.
For purposes of illustration, let us take three cases:
(I) Where A, of New York, sues B, of Virginia, in a Court Not
of Record and in a Court of Record Before 1789.-In such a case, the
first problem is as to the effect of the Judgment obtained in a Court
not of Record. Such a Judgment is merely prima facie evidence of
the debt sued on, and therefore, we say that, where A sues B in Virginia on such a Judgment, he is suing as if he were suing in Debt on
Simple Contract, which means, in plain English, that the plaintiff
will be required to prove his debt over again, and that the defendant
may Defend in Virginia by a Plea of Nil Debet-not indebted. The
injection of the Full Faith and Credit Clause under the Constitution
after 1789, in no way changed the result, as that Clause applied only
to Judgments rendered in Courts of Record.
253 Woods v. Pettis, 4 Vt. 556 (1832).
Debt on a Simple Contract or Assumpsit will not lie on a Judgment rendered in
a Court of Record in a sister state. llinois: Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Barker, 55

Ill. 241 (1870) ; Vermont: Boston India Rubber Factory v. Holt, 14 Vt. 92 (1842).
254 Cole v. Driscoll, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 16 (1818).

255 Walker v. Witter, 1 Doug. 1, 99 Eng. Rep. 1 (1778).
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This brings us to the second problem in our case, and that is,
what is the effect of the Judgment obtained in New York in a Court
of Record, where sued upon before 1789? The answer is that the effect
is exactly the same as if the Judgment sued upon had been rendered
in a Court of Record, which brings us to our second hypothetical case:
(II) Where A, of New York, sues B, of Virginia, in a Court Not
of Record and in a Court of Record after 1789.-After 1789, when
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution took effect, if A
of New York, sued B, of Virginia, on a Judgment obtained in New
York in a Court Not of Record, he was suing as if he were suing in
Debt on Simple Contract, with the same effect as before the Adoption
of the Constitution. But if A, of New fork sued B, of Virginia, on a
Judgment obtained in New York in a Court of Record, he was suing
as if he were suing in Debt on a Specialty,2 56 which means, in plain
English, that the Debt is merged in the Judgment, that the Debt
does not again have to be proved, being imported from the mere
existence of the Judgment rendered in a Court of Rcord, just as in
Actions upon Specialty Contracts, the Consideration need not be
proved, being imported from the character of the Sealed Instrument.
This brings us to our third hypothetical case:
(III) Where A, of New York, sues B, of London, England, in
Debt on a Judgment Rendered in a Court of Record or Not in a Court
of Record.-In both instances, Debt will lie, but the Judgment will not
have the effect of a Record or Specialty. And, if B, of London, sues A
of New York on a Judgment obtained in England, he will be suing as if
he were suing in Debt on Simple Contract, in which the General Issue
is Nil Debet; whereas, when A sues so as to be within the Scope of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, he is suing as if he
were suing in Debt on a Specialty, and in such case the defendant's
Plea would be Nul Tiel Record (no such record). A few states permit
the Defense of Fraud or a Lack of Jurisdiction.
256 Illinois: Greathouse v. Smith, 3 Scam. (II.) 541 (1842); St. Louis, A. & T. H.
R. Co. v. Miller, 43 Ill. 199 (1867); Young v. Cooper, 59 Ill. 121 (1871); Blattner v.

Frost, 44 Ill. App. 580 (1892); Kentucky: Williams v. Preston, 3 J. J. Marsh (Ky.) 600,
20 Am. Dec. 179 (1830). Assumpsit does not lie in these cases.

Debt does not lie on a Judgment of Foreclosure of a mortgage, directing, in the
alternative, the payment of the amount due, or a sale of the land. Burges v. Souther,
15 R. I. 202, 2 Ad. 441 (1885). Cf. Blattner v. Frost, 44 Ill. App. 580 (1892).
It does lie on a Decree in Equity directing absolutely the payment of a sum certain.
Illinois: Warren v. McCarthy, 25 I1H.95 (1860); New York: Post v. Neafie, 3 Cai.
(N. Y.) 22 (1805). See, also, articles by Hohfeld, Relations Between Equity and Law,
11 MicH. L. REv. 537, 568 (1913); Cook, The Powers O1 Equity, 15 CoL. L. Rav. 37 at
237 (1915).
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Debts Upon Recognizance
THESE debts involve a sum of money, recognized or acknowledged
to be due to the state or to an individual, in the presence of some Court
or Magistrate, with a Condition that such acknowledgment shall be
good upon the appearance of the party in a criminal proceeding, his
good behavior, or the like; and these, if Forfeited upon Nonperformance of the Condition, are also ranked among this principal class of
debts, viz. Debts of Record, since the contract on which they are
founded is witnessed by the highest kind of evidence, viz. by Matter
57
of Judicial Record
The Mode of Declaringin Debt Upon Judgments
IF the Action is Based on a Judgment obtained in a Court of
Record, no statement of the cause of action on which the Record was
founded is necessary. 258 The Statement should consist of a Description of the Judgment, which may be in a concise form, and need not
state in full the previous proceedings in the action in which it was
obtained. 5 9 The particular form which should be used may be a brief
statement that, at a certain time and in a certain Court of a given
County and State, an action was duly brought, and that in such action
a Judgment was duly rendered in favor of the plaintiff therein for a
certain sum; and, while it has been held unnecessary to allege that
such Judgment is still in force, it would seem the better practice to
do so2 0 If the Judgment sued on is a domestic one, rendered by a
Court of the State in which it is sought to be enforced, and by a Court
of Record, it is not essential to allege that such Court had jurisdiction,
the statement that it was a Court of Record being sufficient; but if
257 Illinois: Pate v. People, 15 I1. 221 (1853); Eimer v. Richards, 25 111. 260
(1861); Maine: State v. Folsom, 26 Me. 209 (1846); Massachusetts: Commissioner v.
Green, 12 Mass. 1 (1815); Green v. Dana, 13 Mass. 493 (1816); National Surety Co.
v. Nazzaro, 233 Mass. 74, 123 N. E. 346 (1919). See, also, 1 WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAv OF CONTRACTs, c. VIII, § 220, 664 (New York 1936-1945).
The Recognizance is equivalent to a Judgment; nothing remains to be done but
Execution. Within a year from the date fixed for payment, a Writ of Execution will
issue as a matter of course, on the creditor applying for it, unless the debtor, having
discharged his duty, has procured the cancellation of the entry which described the
confession. The Recognizance was formerly in more common use than now, and large
sums of money were lent upon its security.
258 New York: Green v. Ovington, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 55 (1819); Federal: Biddle
v. Wilkins, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 686, 7 L. Ed. 315 (1828).
259 Denison v. Williams, 4 Conn. 402 (1822).
260 A Declaration on a Judgment should describe the Court by which it was

rendered, the place where it was held, the names of the parties, the date at which it
was entered, and the amount of the Judgment. 23 Cyc. 1514, N. 43 (1904).
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rendered by an Inferior Court, as that of a Justice of the Peace, it
should be Averred that the Court had Jurisdiction, both of the parties
and the subject matter. Where the Judgment is a Foreign One,
rendered in a Court of a Foreign Country, the Allegation of such
Jurisdiction is always necessary, but not where Judgment is rendered
by a Court of General Jurisdiction in a sister state,2 61 and, in declaring upon a Justice's Judgment of a sister state, the statute conferring
2
jutisdiction upon the justice must also be pleaded
X.

STATUS UNDER MODERN CODES, PRACTICE ACTS

AND RULES OF COURT
THE Status of the Action of Debt under Modern Codes, Practice
Acts and Rules of Court may be made clear by reference to three or
four cases. Within four years after the Code of Procedure was
adopted in 1848, the issue was presented in Allen & Carpenter v.
Patterson, 63 in an Action which, under the Code, was equivalent to
either an Action of Debt or Indebitatus Assumpsit, inwhich the plaintiff brought suit for goods sold and delivered, under the Code Provision
that the Complaint should contain a plain and concise statement of the
facts constituting the cause of action, alleging that the defendant was
indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $371.01 for goods sold, and that
there "is now due them from the defendants the said sum for which
they demand Judgment, &c." The defendant Demurred on the ground
that the complaint did not state a cause of action in that the Allega.
tion that "there is now due," did not amount to a statement that the
debt had become due and payable, or that it meant no more than the
statement that the defendant is "indebted." In affirming the Judgment
of the General Term, the Court of Appeals declared that it was required to treat the term "due" as having been used in the Complaint
to express the fact that the money sought to be recovered had become
payable. The Court declared:
"The Code requires that a Complaint shall contain a plain and
261 Illinois: Rae v. Hulbert, 17 Ill.
572 (1856), involving a sister state; Pennsylva.
nia: Mink v. Shaffer, 124 Pa. 280, 16 Atl. 805 (1889); Texas: Henry v. Allen, 82 Tex.
35, 17 S.W. 515 (1891); Federal: Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65, 14 L. Ed. 847

(1853).

262 Sheldon v. Hopkins, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 436 (1831); see, also, the following cases:
Illinois: Spooner v. Warner, 2 IM. App. 240 (1878); New York: Stiles v. Stewart, 12
Wend. (N. Y.) 473, 27 Am. Dec. 142 (1834) ; Vermont: Hubbard v. Davis, 1 Aiken (Vt.)
296 (1825).
263 7 N. Y. 476 (1852).
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concise statement of the facts constituting the Cause of Action (142).
Every fact which the plaintiff must prove to enable him to maintain his
suit, and which the defendant has a right to controvert in his answer,
must be distinctly averred or stated. This rule of pleading in an action
for a legal remedy is the same as formerly in this, that facts and not
the evidence of facts must be pleaded (1 Chitty Pl. 215; Read v.
Brookman, 3 Term, 159, per BULL:ER, J.; Eno v. Woodworth, 4 Com.
249)." ....
"The counsel for the defendant insisted that the statement that
there is 'due,' &c., did not amount to a statement that the debt had
become payable; that it meant no more than the statement that the
defendant is 'indebted,' &c., and that if the word 'due' had two
significations, the pleader could not select between them, and impute
to it the one which suits his purpose best; for the maxim was that
everything should be taken most strongly against the pleader, or if
the meaning of the words be equivocal and two meanings present
themselves, that construction shall be adopted which is most unfavorable to the party pleading. In the case of United States v. Stare Bank
of North Carolina (6 Pet. 29), Judge Story said that the term 'due'
was sometimes used to express the mere statement of indebtment, and
then it was an equivalent to owed or owing, and it was sometimes used
to express the fact that the debt had become payable. In the latter
sense, I think that the word 'due' was used by the pleader in the
complaint in this suit, and in that sense it may be deemed to have
been used." 2"
Five years later, in 1857, in the famous case of McKyring v.
Bull,"" the status of the Action of Debt or its substitute, the Action
of Indebitatus Assumpsit, came up again. The plaintiff brought an
action under the Code, equivalent at Common Law, to an Action of
Debt or Indebitatus Assumpsit, in which he alleged that, as an employee of the defendant, he had performed certain labor and service,
which were the sum of $650, and concluded as follows: "There is now
due to this plaintiff, the sum of one hundred and thirty-four dollars,
which said sum defendant refuses to pay; wherefore plaintiff demands
Judgment in this action &c. The defendant pleaded a General Denial.
At the Trial the defendant offered evidence of payment as a Defense
to the Action, which was objected to and excluded on the ground
that it should have been pleaded. The Jury found a Verdict for the
264 Allen & Carpenter v. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 476 (1852).
265 16 New York 297, 69 Am. Dec. 696 (1857).

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VoL. 4

Plaintiff, upon which Judgment was entered. The defendant, having
made out a Bill of Exceptions, the Judgment, on Appeal was affirmed
by the Superior Court at General Term. In affirming the Judgment,
the Court of Appeals, speaking through Selden, J., declared:
"Although the Code of Procedure has abrogated the CommonLaw System of Pleading, with all of its technical rules, yet, in one respect, the new system which it has introduced bears a close analogy
to that for which it has been substituted. The general denial allowed
by the Code corresponds very nearly with the General Issue, in actions
of Assumpsit and of Debt on Simple Contract, at Common Law. The
decisions upon the subject, therefore, in the English courts, although
not obligatory as precedents since the changes introduced by the Code,
will nevertheless be found to throw much light upon the question
presented here."
"While the General Issue, both in Assumpsit and Debt, was, in
theory, what the general denial allowed by the Code is in face, viz.,
a simple traverse of the material allegations of the Declaration or
Complaint, yet, from the different phraseology adopted in the Two
Forms of Action, a very different result was produced. The Declaration, in Debt, averred an existing indebtedness, and this amount was
traversed by the plea of nil debet, in the present tense; hence, nothing
could be excluded which tended to prove that there was no subsisting
debt when the suit was commenced. In Assumpsit, on the contrary,
both the averment in the Declaration and the traverse in the plea
were in the past, instead of the present, tense, and related to a time
anterior to the commencement of the suit. Under non assurnpsit,therefore, so long as the rule of pleading which excludes all proof not
strictly within the issue was adhered to, no evidence could be received
except such as would tend to show that the defendant never made the
promise. That this was the view taken of these pleas, in the earlier
cases, .is
clear." ....
"My conclusion therefore is, that neither payment nor any other
defence, which confesses and avoids the Cause of Action, can in any
case be given in evidence as a defence, under an answer containing
' 200
simple a General Denial of the Allegations of the Complaint.
In the 1919 Delaware Case of Ogden-Howard Co. v. Brand,20 7
a buyer and manager of a corporation, employed by contract under
266 McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297, 298, 299, 69 Am. Dec. 696, 697, 704 (1857).
267 7 Boyce 482, 108 A. 277.
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seal at a salary of $100 per week, terminable on six months' notice,
and who was wrongfully discharged, was not able to maintain Actions
of Debt to recover weekly installments of salary for the six months
period for which his contract entitled him to notice, the damages being
unliquidated. In revising the Judgment below, the Court observed:
"The question presented by the first assignment of error is
whether under a contract of hiring, such as the one before us, an Action
of Debt will lie, where an employee has been wrongfully dismissed
during the term of employment, for the recovery of damages for
wages after dismissal, nothing being due for wages actually earned.
The plaintiff in error contends that the damages recoverable are not
for a sum certain, or capable of being reduced to a certainty by calculation, and therefore an Action of Debt will not Lie."
"The defendant in error claims that under the terms of the contract, there were two distinct periods of time involved, to wit, the first
six months. after his discharge without notice as provided in the contract, during which time he was entitled to the sum of one hundred
dollars per week, as liquidated damages, and second, the period between the expiration of said six months and the end of the term provided in the contract, during which time the damages were unliquidated. The defendant in error contends that the damages were
liquidated and the Action of Debt was the proper action to bring in
each of the five cases now before this court; for the reason that they
were brought to recover weekly wages due within the period provided
in the contract for notice of its termination, and in support of this contention cites Shea v. Kerr, 1 Pennewill, 530, 43 Atl. 843; Love v.
Pusey & Jones Co., 3 Pennewill, 577, 52 Atl. 542."

.

.

.

. "We are

therefore of the opinion that the Court below was in error in declining
to give binding instructions to the Jury to return a Verdict for the
defendant, on the ground that the Damages recoverable by a wrongare
fully discharged employee for the unexpired period of the contract,
2 68
Debt.
of
Action
an
in
recoverable
unliquidated, and not
Ogden-Howard Co. v. Brand, 7 Boyce 482, 483, 108A, 277, 278 (1919).
In the case of Williamsson v. Columbia Gas and Electric Corporation, 110 (2d) 15,
decided in 1909 the Circuit Court of Appeals took notice of the formal view of Delaware
on the Action of Debt, as applied to the Delaware Statute of Limitations. Chief Justice
Mars declared:
"In order to apply a Statute of Limitations, such as that of Delaware, which reads
in terms of Pommon Law Actions, to a Civil Action brought in a District Court, it is
necessary for the Court through a consideration of the nature of the Cause of Action
disclosed in the Complaint to determine the Form of Action which would have been
brought upon it at Common Law. It is evident that the complaint in the case before
268
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Finally, we come to the 1944 case of Stinson v. Edgemoor Iron
Works,2e9 a Federal case, decided in 1944 and involving diversity of
citizenship Jurisdiction, and decided under the Delaware Law. The
plaintiff alleged that he was employed by the defendant for one year
from February 22, 1943, under a contractual arrangement reached on
March 12, 1943, but retroactive to February 22, 1943, at an annual
salary of $8,200; that the defendant breached the contract by wrongfully discharging the plaintiff on March 17, 1943, whereby he became
entitled to damages in an amount representing the balance of his unpaid salary, the amount of which is $6,491.65. The defendant Moved
to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had failed
to state a cause of action. As the Substantive Law of Delaware was
to be applied, the issue was whether Debt would lie on this state of
facts. In denying the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the United
States District Court declared:
"The Delaware System of Pleading and Practice is presently
that which prevailed in England at the time of the separation of the
Colonies. Whatever may have been the changes in the Action of Debt
in other states, that Action in Delaware remains today as it was at
Common Law in England even prior to the adoption of the Hilary
Rules in 1834. It is very clear that the Action of Debt as developed
in England prior to the Hilary Rules of 1834 could not be used to
recover Damages for breach of an employment contract. In such
suits the amount of Damages-in accordance with the test set forth
in the Delaware case of Ogden-Howard-is necessarily uncertain and
unliquidated. The amount of such Damages can only be ascertained
by Judgment of the Court or by Verdict of a Jury after the consideration of many factors. The Delaware authorities reassert the principle
that an Action of Debt will not lie, unless the demand is for a sum
certain, or for a pecuniary demand which can readily be reduced to
certainty by computation. No Delaware case has been found which
us discloses a Cause of Action which, under the Common Law of Delaware, would be
enforceable in an Action on the Case and not in an Action of Debt on a Specialty. The

District Court, therefore, properly held that the action was barred by the Delaware
Statute of Limitations."
And this was the view taken despite the plaintiff's contention that the "Civil Action"
provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S. C. A. following Section
723c, had abolished all distinctions in the Forms of Action. The State Statutes of Limitations based upon differences in Fornjs of Action no longer apply.
For a similar unavailing contention under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act
of 1783, See Gibbs v. Guild, [1882] 9 0. B. D. 59, 67.
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even hints that its Courts are disposed to deviate from the limitations of the Action of Debt as they existed in England at the time
of the Revolution. Delaware inherited from England the law relative
to an Action of Debt, and that law remains in force until it is changed
by the Delaware Courts or its Legislature. In fact, there have been
no changes in the Delaware law relative to Actions of Debt, except
in one instance. In 1933 the Legislature of the State of Delaware,
Laws of Del., Vol. 38, Chap. 201, abolished the distinction between
an Action of Covenant and one of Debt. But only to this limited extent
has the original Action of Debt been changed from its formal status
at Common Law and this was apparently found necessary by the
enactment of a specific statute for this particular purpose." ...
"Viewed against the Historical Development of the Action of
Debt, it is apparent that Debt would not lie in Delaware to recover
Damages or compensation for breach of an employment contract regardless of the Allegations in the Declaration. I consequently think
it clear that Ogden-Howard Co. v. Brand, supra, merely held that
an Action of Debt was not the proper Form of Action, and consequently there is no basis for defendant's contention that there are
additional holdings implicit, in that decision.
"The precise problem before me is, therefore, the simple one of
whether the Complaint filed in the instant case is sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28
U. S. C. A. following section 723c. I think it sufficient-especially,
since the rules are to be construed to 'secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.' Here, the plaintiff, after
stating the existence of a contract of employment, and a discharge
without cause by the defendant-employer, alleges: '8. By reason of
Defendant's said breach of its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff is entitled to Damages from Defendant in an amount representing the
balance of Plaintiff's unpaid salary under his said contract with
Defendant, the amount of which is the sum of $6,491.65.' I think this
is a perfectly adequate and clear allegation and one that satisfies the
requirement of Rule 8. ' '27o

It would appear from the foregoing survey, therefore, that the
Action of Debt is today still as strong and vigorous as it was in the
early stages of its development, the only change being that it is now
brought under the Single, Formless Form of Action as prescribed by
Modern Codes, Practice Acts and Rules of Court.
270 Stinson v. Edgemoor Iron Works, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 864, 867, 868 (1944).

